

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

OCTOBER, 1977

## THE SOVIET UNION, 1977

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*The Soviet Union* ..... Inside Back Cover

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# Current History

OCTOBER, 1977

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*In this issue, seven specialists evaluate the political, economic and military situation in the Soviet Union. As our introductory article points out, "The Soviet Union has clearly become a global superpower. . . . Yet while the U.S.S.R. has negated United States predominance, it has not superseded it. Talk of Soviet superiority on the strategic arena is fatuous as long as mutual assured destruction, MAD, prevails as the operative characteristic of the strategic power balance."*

## Soviet Strategic Capabilities: The Superpower "Balance"

BY C. G. JACOBSEN

*Professor of Military and Strategic Studies, Acadia University*

RECENT newspaper headlines purporting to be relevant for SALT (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) in fact reflect more on domestic political perceptions than they do on strategic realities. Thus the neutron bomb may have consequential impact on tactical battlefield considerations, but it is not new, and its procurement does not alter the basic strategic equilibrium. The B-1 bomber is a beautiful bird, yet United States President Jimmy Carter's decision clearly reflected the consensus of informed opinion. Its production would not have decisive import on the balance of power, and the alternative of 747 or otherwise transported standoff cruise missiles appeared to most analysts to be far more cost-effective, safer and more efficient.

The public choke points of SALT II aspirations, the Soviet Backfire bomber and the potential of the cruise missile are, in fact, also of minimum consequence as far as the ultimate balance is concerned, and reflect political rather than military problems. They reflect the lack of political will, the disrepair of détente. They are false issues, manipulated into artificially presentable

rationales for not negotiating. The United States insistence on dealing with the Backfire in strategic arms negotiations is obfuscatory, both in view of the fact that the plane could in any case only reach the United States on suicidal one-way missions at subsonic speeds (the vision of its refueling in Havana in the midst of a nuclear war requires no comment), and in view of the fact that the United States has more than 1,000 (FBS) fighter-bombers with a similar capacity to strike at the Soviet Union (all of which have been excluded from SALT due to American insistence that their range-limitations make them "tactical," not "strategic"). As for the cruise missile, the stance on both sides indicates a disinclination to negotiate. True, it appears cheap (though slow and relatively vulnerable), it is useful, and the United States leads in the development of long-range versions. Yet the ultimate system cost may be very different from that of its missile components, if account is taken of probable countermeasures and counter-counter requirements. In any case, the cruise missile will not change the strategic balance. It is at most going to allow for an even more redundant capacity for overkill. And it is not even going to remain a United States preserve for long. Soviet mastery of shorter-range versions and current Soviet progress in long-range guidance capabilities make this clear. Cruise missile technology is after all not revolutionary, but is rather a refinement of long-existing, dormant technological trends.<sup>1</sup>

What, then, are the most important considerations, problems and challenges of today's strategic realities?

<sup>1</sup>Those wishing to pursue the concerns of this article are referred to "The Evolution of Soviet Theory and Capability re Intervention in Distant Areas," a report commissioned by the General Research Corporation of McLean, Virginia; and "Ballistic Missile Defence: A Survey of the Historical Evolution of Soviet Concepts, Research and Deployment," in the 1977 *Soviet Military Review Annual*, forthcoming from Academic International. For background information, see also John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities," in *Current History*, vol. 71, no. 420 (October, 1976), pp. 97 ff.



The answer can only be sought through reference to the historical context. By the mid-1970's, the U.S.S.R. had reached something akin to parity with the United States. To understand what this entails, it is necessary to trace the development of capabilities and the evolution of theory.

Throughout the late 1940's and most of the 1950's, Moscow had been locked into strategic inferiority through its lack of any sure means of long-range war-head delivery. The Soviet development of an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) capability promised release from this straitjacket. But Soviet leaders soon realized that early Soviet missiles were too faulty, too unreliable and, above all, too vulnerable to takeout by still superior United States delivery means. In the early 1960's, Soviet military leaders concentrated on securing the survivability of their limited strategic potential: they built reinforced silos; they experimented with mobile missiles and with ballistic missile defense concepts; they began to move a portion of their missile force to sea; and, finally, they succeeded in developing much-improved command and control systems. By the mid 1960's, the Soviet Union might be said to have effected a secure "second strike" force-deterrent for the first time. It then proceeded in the late 1960's and early mid-1970's with a quantitative building priority aimed at matching the larger panoply and resultant options flexibility of the United States strategic arsenal.

The 1961-initiated program to build a strategic navy with global reach was pursued with vigor. By 1970, emerging capabilities were demonstrated in the first coordinated worldwide exercise "Okean." The mid-1970's saw the initial deployment of the 4,000-5,000 mile range "Delta" SLBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles that could be fired from coastal waters secure from the (in any case marginal) anti-submarine warfare potential of NATO. And the Soviet Union tested the first of a series of "mini-carriers," or "through-deck cruisers," small but potent carriers designed for vertical and short take-off and landing planes.

The same years saw an expansion of the airlift capabilities of the Soviet Union, and a notable strengthening of its nonstrategic forces' capacity to fight in both nuclear and conventional environments. Concomitant with this, in 1972 a novel concept of interventionary wars was advanced. Such wars had been seen as socio-political phenomena resulting from the contradictions inherent in capitalism and its need for captive markets, and were thus regarded as phenomena from which socialist states were, by definition, excluded. In 1972, a prominent Soviet author allowed for the possibility of secular (military) rationales for intervention, giving theoretical leeway to potential "socialist" engagements. Two years later, Defense Minister A. A. Grechko for the first time spoke of a commitment to resist "imperialistic aggression" in "whatever distant region of our

planet it may occur." By 1975, the Soviet Union had proved able and willing, with its allies, to provide extensive, effective assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa.

### SOVIET VIEW OF DEFENSE

But the core of the Soviet Union's now more genuine superpower status lies in its strategic capabilities. The core of its strategic capability, perhaps the main developmental determinant of its ultimate character, may be found in the peculiar "defense" predilection of the Soviet Union and its consequences.

The early attitudes of Soviet leaders to ballistic missile defense (BMD) reflected their profound unease with mutual assured destruction, termed "MAD" by its American detractors. The United States administration-favored tenet holds that mutual vulnerability effected through agreements to desist from defensive procurements will, by guaranteeing to each the unchallenged capacity to destroy the other, in effect prove the most efficacious deterrent, the best guarantee of peace. The contrary Soviet preference for "war survival," for an indigenous defense capacity, was given early expression. It is now clear that the Soviet effort to research and develop a BMD system dates back to the development of a first generation of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). Soviet BMD development was sparked by the success of the Soviet ICBM program, and may be seen as a manifestation of its dialectical view of weapon systems evolution.

A prototype ballistic missile defense system was deployed near Leningrad as early as 1962. It was assigned an improved anti-ballistic missile (ABM) in 1964. Shortly thereafter, this initial experimental deployment appears to have been dismantled, in conjunction with the construction of the first operational BMD complex around Moscow. Subsequent improvements focused on the Moscow locale.

By the mid-1960's, Soviet ABM technology had apparently reached a level of considerable potency vis-à-vis the then-current threat; a number of commentators were becoming convinced that the "cost-exchange ratio," the relative cost of defensive versus offensive system increments, was beginning to shift in favor of the defense. The refusal of Soviet leaders to contemplate BMD restrictions through their preliminary Strategic Arms Limitation Talks negotiations with the administration of President Lyndon Johnson reflected both their theoretical predisposition and their confidence in the developing Soviet ABM potential.

The situation changed by the late 1960's, with the successful United States development of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). When SALT negotiations resumed during the administration of President Richard Nixon, it was Moscow's turn to advocate BMD restrictions. Later Soviet pronouncements and Soviet strategic literature drove home the

point that Moscow had not, and has not, become converted to MAD as anything but a distasteful, temporary state of affairs necessitated by the peculiarities of the technological limitations of the day. And it was also evident that the Soviet volte-face was not due to any excessive awe of United States BMD prospects, although the Nixon administration had finally proceeded with a tentative, limited BMD deployment program in view of the continuing evidence of Soviet BMD predilections and, later, scientific confirmation of changing cost-exchange ratios. Rather, the Soviet change reflected tactical recognition of the fact that the promised effectiveness of then-current Soviet ABM technology against single warhead ICBM's had been emasculated by the saturation potential of MIRV's. Furthermore, the Soviet advocacy of BMD restrictions reflected Soviet recognition of the prospect that MIRV would remain a United States preserve at least until the early 1970's, and that consequential Soviet MIRV deployment would await the mid- and late 1970's. Thus while pioneering Soviet ABM technology appeared offset by the United States MIRV, the developing United States BMD retained promise, because of the continuing Soviet dependence on single warhead missiles.

SALT I placed quantitative limits on offensive and defensive missile systems. The offensive system limitations accorded Moscow pro forma superiority, reflecting the discrepancy between Moscow's preference for reliance on a dyadic mix of land- and sea-based missiles and the contrary United States prejudice for a triad of the two missile modes and a strategic air component. The missile booster superiority granted to the U.S.S.R. could be seen as roughly equivalent to the potential of United States airborne elements. The quantitative limits furthermore appeared to be greater than projected deployment designs and thus nonrestrictive to military establishments that were increasingly oriented to the pursuit of improvements in terms of qualitative measures. Thus there was military quiescence when the respective political leaderships found it politically opportune to cement détente perceptions with an arms agreement. Similar comments apply to SALT's BMD provisions. One rationale for Soviet support was outlined above. United States support flowed from similar calculations, once it became clear that offsetting Soviet MIRV capabilities were imminent.

But Moscow's acceptance of SALT's BMD accord was more complex. In part it sprang from the Soviet acknowledgment that anti-ballistic missile technology had been negated, for the superpower context, by the advent of multiple warhead technologies. The U.S.S.R. faced a situation in which ballistic missile defense deployment extensions could result only in a futile exacerbation of political tensions, because it would not only defy United States strategic preferences but could and surely would be effectively countered by the now more cost-effective American offensive increments that would

inevitably ensue. There ended the analogy with United States considerations. The U.S.S.R. was equally, if not more, motivated by a different realization, namely that the limited BMD capabilities already deployed sufficed to defend against existing and foreseeable third power "ultimate threat" potentials. The defense of the Moscow heartland against the third power threat of perceived greatest potential, namely, China, was augmented by a SALT-condoned Central Asian missile- and radar-testing range (a locale of significant promise in view of the projected flight paths of future Chinese ICBM's). It was, of course, only in late 1975 that the People's Republic of China reportedly deployed its first primitive ICBM's (two); there appeared scant prospect of any Chinese potential to penetrate even the existing modest Moscow BMD complex before well into the 1980's.

Maximum protection of Moscow was the crux. The second operational BMD deployment complex originally provided for was soon seen as expendable, because its realization would only serve to redirect hostile means from one area of secondary importance to another of similar importance. It was a ready candidate when the powers once again felt the need to provide symbolic proof of the beneficence of détente.

Yet ballistic missile defense development had not been arrested. By restricting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment SALT had served to put its status into hiatus, but in this respect it merely sanctified existing realities. As concerns the U.S.S.R. these realities may be traced back to about 1967, when three decisions appear to have been taken. First, since developed ABM designs held too uncertain a promise against the new threat potential additional deployments were deferred in favor of concentration on further research. This decision, to forge ahead with continued large-scale research programs, testified eloquently to the depth of Soviet commitment to "war survival" strategies, to the Soviet Union's abiding dislike of deterrence-dependence or "mutual assured destruction," and, finally, to the perseverance of considerable if less imminent expectations. The persistence of Moscow's striving for strategic defense capabilities was further underlined by the second decision. The Soviet Union announced on January 1, 1968 (and explained in November of that year), that previously voluntary paramilitary training of the civilian populace was henceforth to be obligatory and that training would be extended to schoolchildren.

*(Continued on page 134)*

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*"Soviet policy is known for its patience and Soviet diplomats are sure in the knowledge that the only certainty in the Middle East is political change. . . . Patience is justified by caution, but also by the conviction that has sustained Soviet leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev that, in the long run, the forces of history are on their side."*

# Soviet Policy in Africa and the Middle East

BY JOHN C. CAMPBELL

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THE importance of the Middle East in Soviet policy is beyond question. The Kremlin has expended great efforts and taken major risks to establish its influence in that region, and official statements have reminded us from time to time that events there bear directly on the security of the Soviet Union. In contrast, after the failure of Premier Nikita Khrushchev's adventure in the Congo in the early 1960's, Africa seemed to have much less importance in the Soviet scheme of things. Until the mid-1970's, Moscow appeared to share Washington's view that Africa should be kept out of the cold war competition, not because of détente but because it was just not that important to either superpower.

The past few years have seen a decided change. Relatively quiescent in the Middle East, where they were thrown on the defensive as a result of United States initiatives and inter-Arab politics, Soviet leaders entered a new phase of activity in black Africa. It seemed as if they were trying to compensate for losses in one region by seeking gains in another. But there were broader reasons.

First, for over a decade, the Soviet Union had been building its military strength with the aim of reaching strategic parity with the United States and acquiring a global reach, especially through naval power, that would enable it to exert power and influence on all the seas and all the continents. The Middle East, the Indian Ocean and Africa were regions linked both geographically and in the strategic conceptions of Soviet political and military leaders, and there was little doubt that they intended to establish a permanent military presence in those regions. This was the target area of what Richard Löwenthal has described as Moscow's turn from anti-imperialism to counter-imperialism.<sup>1</sup>

Second, Soviet policy toward the third world continued to be infused with a strong ideological element. Soviet leaders sought ties with governments and political movements they regarded as natural allies against

the capitalist West, because of their anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, or national liberationist character, or because they bore those labels. Third, the Chinese were active in Africa, and the Soviets felt compelled to meet their challenge on both the diplomatic and the ideological front. Fourth, in the uncalculated course of events, Africa presented opportunities that the Kremlin was loath to pass up, especially when there were so few such opportunities elsewhere.

## ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

The Soviet opening to black Africa came unexpectedly with the revolution of 1974 in Portugal, which had its origins in the endless colonial war and the consequent loss of the African colonies. It is not clear what aims the Soviets had in Portugal itself, where the Communist party was striving for a leading role and eventually failed. But the maintenance of a leftist regime in Lisbon for a period long enough to effect the transfer of Angola and Mozambique to the acceptable local revolutionary movements was indeed a Soviet aim that was realized. In Mozambique, the liberation movement called Frelimo, with radical Marxist leadership, was certain to take over. In Angola, the comparable movement, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, had long been helped by the Soviet Union but had to contend with rival forces that had modest support from other African states, from the United States and from China.

Soviet leaders made a decision some time in 1975 to give the MPLA decisive help in order to insure its victory. They provided Soviet arms in quantity and they transported between 12,000 and 15,000 Cuban troops, offered by Fidel Castro, to take a direct part in the fighting. The MPLA had the momentum and the arms. Its opponents had neither the organized local support nor sufficient outside help to put up effective resistance. The United States stayed out. China quietly disengaged from her ties with UNITA (the National Union for Total Independence of Angola), the main rival of MPLA in southern Angola. And the temporary intervention of South African forces on the side of UNITA made it inevitable that the black African states, which

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<sup>1</sup>Richard Löwenthal, *Model or Ally: The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 359-364.

had been divided on the question, would all come to accept the MPLA as the government of Angola.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet leadership showed it would take risks by following this bold policy in Angola. They bet on MPLA's ability to win on the battlefield, which was not a certainty, although the employment of the Cubans may have made it so. That choice of means, however, was sure to intensify the United States reaction and perhaps jeopardize the broad Soviet interest in the continuance of détente with the United States. It was a calculated risk: that the United States would not intervene physically and that the damage to détente—or rather to Soviet expectations of détente—would not be serious.

On balance the gamble paid off, at least in the short run. The United States reaction in deeds was negligible. Congress would not permit the administration to send even modest aid to the factions opposing MPLA. The reaction in words was sharp, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger making it clear that his conception of détente did not include this kind of action. He accepted the Soviet maneuver because he had to, but he vowed that it “will not be tolerated elsewhere.”<sup>3</sup> The Soviets did seem to be surprised, and not a little worried, by the bitterness and distrust that their Angolan venture had injected into American attitudes. But they merely replied with offended innocence. Why should the Soviet Union not aid MPLA? It was acting in line with a long-term consistent policy favoring national liberation movements while the United States was supplying arms to Portugal. And was not MPLA representative of the will of the Angolan people, as shown by its victories and by the support it received from other African nations?

### THE COMING CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Soviet policy in Angola must be seen in the context of the situation in all of southern Africa. The Portuguese colonies had provided protection for the white regimes in Rhodesia and in South Africa. The Soviets

saw that the advent of black radical regimes in Angola and Mozambique would increase racial tensions, put more pressure on Salisbury and Pretoria, and create new dilemmas for the United States. By helping MPLA and Frelimo to consolidate their power Moscow would not only have friendly regimes in strategically placed countries; it would also be associating itself with black Africa in the inevitable conflict ahead. This was something solid on which to build a policy. Africans might be uncertain about scientific socialism, but there was no question where they stood on white rule and apartheid.

There was no certainty (as some Americans who opposed their own country's involvement in the Angolan affair argued) that MPLA would be able to maintain its position indefinitely, given its own weaknesses and the political and tribal conflicts that would continue to divide the country, or that the Soviet Union would retain forever a preeminent position. But meanwhile MPLA was there and the United States had to deal with it.<sup>4</sup>

Within a year of its victory MPLA, still dependent on Cuban forces to maintain order, had undergone an internal crisis that raised questions about Neto's authority and about his loyalty to Moscow. An unsuccessful coup in May, 1977, by two ministers known for their pro-Soviet inclinations left the Soviet leaders to ponder its lessons. The record of the many African states that have shifted their foreign alignments as they have undergone political change at home at one time or another could hardly be reassuring.

As the scene shifted to Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South-west Africa (Namibia) and South Africa, the Soviets were mainly interested in establishing their position as patron, supporter, and supplier of arms to the forces working for black rule in those countries. They ridiculed the last-minute personal efforts of Henry Kissinger to reach agreement on a peaceful evolution to majority rule in Rhodesia and on the transition of Namibia from South African control to independence.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, they appeared to be building up Angola and Mozambique, especially the latter, as bases for the mobilization, arming and training of guerrilla forces to operate in Rhodesia, Namibia and eventually South Africa itself.

In October, 1976, the U.S.S.R. and Angola signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation. The cooperation already in progress and continuing after the treaty, judging from press and intelligence reports, covered a wide range of advice, training and assistance in many fields, from the military forces and the security policy to administration, industries and the fishing fleet.<sup>6</sup> In March, 1977, the U.S.S.R. concluded a similar treaty with Mozambique. Because Mozambique's leader, Samora Machel, had declared his intention to make his country Africa's first authentic Marxist-Leninist state, the Soviets seemed to be providing arms

<sup>2</sup>John A. Marcum, “Lessons of Angola,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 54, no. 3 (April, 1976), pp. 407-425.

<sup>3</sup>“Implications of Angola for Future U.S. Foreign Policy,” *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 74, no. 1912 (February 16, 1976), pp. 174-182.

<sup>4</sup>As Senator Dick Clark put it, “In my opinion the United States has only one real option in Angola: to begin serious dialogue with the MPLA,” *The Washington Post*, February 7, 1976.

<sup>5</sup>A. Galybin, “Namibia's Fight for Freedom,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 12, 1976, pp. 59-64; A. Runov, “Death Throes of Racist Regime,” *ibid.*, no. 1, 1977, pp. 68-73.

<sup>6</sup>*The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?* Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, by the Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, May, 1977), pp. 105-109. Text of the U.S.S.R.-Angola treaty and of agreement between the Soviet Communist party and MPLA are in *Pravda*, October 9, 14, 1976.



and economic aid with special enthusiasm, and in doing so they clearly outdistanced the Chinese as contenders for influence. Western influence was close to zero, although Mozambique was careful not to break off her ties with the West and not to disrupt her much needed economic relations with South Africa.

Having made these gains in the former Portuguese colonies, however, the Soviet Union did not recklessly push forward in other areas, preferring to avoid overcommitment and to keep control of its own policies. The Cubans had been useful in Angola, and by 1977 Cuban contingents were present in a number of other African countries. But if there was an agreed Soviet-Cuban strategy for using them in further military actions, its execution was being held in reserve. The bizarre "Katangan" invasion of Zaire from Angola in the spring of 1977 may have had some Soviet or Cuban inspiration, but if so the hand was well hidden. When Zaire's President Sese Mobutu cleverly mobilized support from Morocco, Egypt and elsewhere to overcome the crisis, the Soviets could plausibly deny his accusations of Soviet involvement on the rebels' side, while their press took the occasion to make countercharges against China and the West.

### THE HORN OF AFRICA

There was another part of Africa attracting Soviet attention, however, where events seemed to be controlling policy rather than the other way around. That was the Horn, an area closer to Soviet strategic concerns because of its location at the juncture of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean and on the line of division between Arab Africa and black Africa. In the turmoil of this region, the conflict between the Arab world and Israel, the inter-Arab tensions, and the tensions among African states were all interrelated, and most of them were interlocked in one way or another with the rivalries of the great powers.<sup>7</sup>

As it expanded its military power in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, especially after the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, the Soviet Union undoubtedly aimed at the establishment of facilities in this area for the use of its naval and air forces in various contingencies of peace or war. For this purpose and for the general enlargement of its political influence, by the beginning of the 1970's it had established close ties with a number of states bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden: Egypt, Sudan, North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic), South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) and Somalia. Of particular importance were the port facilities at Aden in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.) and the complex

at Berbera in Somalia, which was an air and missile base—although Soviet facilities on foreign soil by definition were never bases.<sup>8</sup> At this stage, the only country in the Horn with close United States connections was Ethiopia; and the Arab states, with Soviet encouragement, were supporting a rebellion in Eritrea that the Ethiopian government had not been able to crush.

By the end of 1976, however, the situation had changed drastically, and not to the advantage of the Soviet Union. President Anwar Sadat had fired his Soviet advisers, denied facilities to the Soviet Union, and denounced the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of cooperation signed in 1971. Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiri, who blamed the Soviet Union for two attempts to overthrow him, was cutting down Sudan's military ties with Moscow and turning to the United States and to China. Yemen had gradually slipped away from Soviet influence as she moved closer to Saudi Arabia. Then, in what might become the most telling blow of all, the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet government of Saudi Arabia, using large supplies of oil money and appeals to Arab solidarity, tried to draw the P.D.R.Y. and Somalia, the two radical states that were close ideologically and very important strategically to Moscow, out of the Soviet sphere and into alignment with other Arab states.

In southern Arabia, the Soviets had for years been supporting the radical regime in the P.D.R.Y., which in turn was serving as a base for rebels in the neighboring and pro-Western state of Oman. Then, in March, 1976, after a long period of mutual hostility Saudi Arabia and the P.D.R.Y. established diplomatic relations and made plans for economic cooperation.<sup>9</sup> The Marxist regime in Aden may not have changed its ideology or broken with Moscow but was undoubtedly attracted by the prospect of financial help well beyond what Marxist friends in Moscow or in Peking had been providing. Similarly, in Somalia, Saudi diplomacy urged the regime of Mohammed Siad-Barre to consider the benefits of solidarity and economic cooperation compared to the dangers of alignment with an outside power (i.e., the U.S.S.R.). This petrodollar diplomacy achieved some success—enough apparently to cause disillusionment in the Kremlin and to bring about a review of its policies. Its aid to the P.D.R.Y. and to Somalia continued, but with no assurance that it would pay off.

The Soviet Union's involvement in Ethiopia can only be explained in the light of its eroding position in other states of the region. At that juncture, United States influence in Ethiopia, which had been declining since the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, began to crumble rapidly. Colonel Mariam Mengistu, who gained full control of the government after a gun battle with political opponents in February, 1977, gave the coup de grace to the long-standing relationship with the United States by ordering all American mili-

<sup>7</sup>See Christopher Stevens, *The Soviet Union and Black Africa* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1976), pp. 172-182.

<sup>8</sup>John W. Finney, "The Soviets in Somalia: A Facility Not a Base," *The New York Times*, July 6, 1975.

<sup>9</sup>*The Washington Post*, March 12, 1976.



tary and other missions out of the country (except for a restricted embassy staff) and closing the United States communications station at Kagnew. Already in receipt of substantial arms deliveries from the U.S.S.R., Mengistu subsequently dramatized Ethiopia's reversal of alliances by going to Moscow to sign a declaration and protocol of friendship and aid.<sup>10</sup>

The flurry of visits by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny to countries in the region of the Horn and the Red Sea in the spring of 1977 was an attempt somehow to reconcile the Soviet Union's old friends and new friends in a fraternal grouping for peace, progress, and the struggle against imperialism. The persistent conflicts among those countries, however, and especially the territorial dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia (certain to be sharpened by their conflicting claims to the territory of the Afars and Issas [Djibouti], recently granted independence by France) made it almost impossible to bring them together for any purpose. Indeed, the warmth of the Soviet embrace of Ethiopia, if it did not indicate resignation to the loss of influence in Somalia, could only contribute to that outcome.

Ethiopia under Colonel Mengistu is beset by many troubles, internal and external. She is confronted with dissidence and rebellion not only in Eritrea but also in other parts of the country. It may have been a measure of the desperation of Soviet leaders that they pinned their hopes on Mengistu's regime. However revolutionary, progressive, and anti-American the regime may be, it has many enemies among the Arab and African countries, both radical and conservative, that have been and are of some importance to Soviet strategy.

Comment coming out of Moscow indicated that the new Ethiopian connection had indeed acquired great weight. As tension rose on Ethiopia's borders, particularly on the border between Ethiopia and Sudan, which at this point chose to expel her Soviet military mission, the Soviet press accused Khartoum of playing into the hands of the imperialists, harming the cause of liberation in southern Africa and the Arab struggle against Israeli aggression, and threatening progressive, peaceful and nonaligned Ethiopia.<sup>11</sup> As an official statement on June 6, 1977, warned, the Soviet Union "strongly condemned" those preparing aggression against Ethiopia and reminded them of their "heavy responsibility before the peoples of Africa and the whole world."<sup>12</sup>

## THE RIFT WITH EGYPT

Located on the land bridge between Asia and Africa

<sup>10</sup>The visit was given full coverage by the Soviet press. See *Pravda*, May 5-7, 1977.

<sup>11</sup>Y. Tsaplin, "Playing with Fire," *New Times*, no. 25, June, 1977, p. 12.

<sup>12</sup>*Pravda*, June 7, 1977.

<sup>13</sup>Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 188-198.

and on the sea route from Europe to the Indian Ocean at its most vulnerable point—the Suez Canal—Egypt has had a key place in Soviet strategy since the mid-1950's. In the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt became the leading state of the Arab world and the main channel by which the Soviet Union established its own powerful presence in the Middle East and in Africa. Soviet leaders valued their links with Nasser and supported the cause of radical Arab nationalism against Israel, against conservative Arab regimes and against the West. Nasser defended Egypt's independence when he felt the Soviets were encroaching on it, but he established a working arrangement with Moscow by means of which he secured arms, economic aid and political support, and in turn accepted a considerable Soviet military presence in Egypt.

Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser on the latter's death in 1970, was more distrustful of the Kremlin and was increasingly aware that the interests of the Soviet Union, a global superpower, and those of Egypt, with its strictly local and regional concerns, were by no means identical. The rift between Egypt and the Soviet Union began early in May, 1971, when Sadat won out in a domestic test of strength with rivals more favorably inclined toward Moscow than he was—even though he followed up his victory by signing a 15-year security treaty with the U.S.S.R. In the following year, Sadat startled the Soviets and the world by demanding the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel (some 20,000) and curtailing the Soviet navy's use of Egyptian port facilities. This was a gesture of Egyptian nationalism, a protest against failure to secure the kinds of arms Egypt wanted and against the overbearing conduct of the Soviets. But above all Sadat was clearing the way to make his own decision for war or for peace with Israel without interference from an ally whose pursuit of global interests, especially the new *détente* with the United States, seemed to be conducted at Egypt's expense. Sadat's demands were also a means of strengthening his position at home and in relations with other Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia.<sup>13</sup>

Sadat made his decision for war with Israel in 1973, and the Soviets supplied him with arms to prepare for that war and to wage it, while the United States supplied arms to Israel. The outcome of the war, however, and the new and more active diplomacy of the United States merely confirmed Sadat in his conviction that the Soviet Union could not help him solve Egypt's major problems, whereas the United States, with its influence on Israel and its potential economic support, could. Kissinger's success in negotiating limited Israeli withdrawals in the two Sinai agreements, in 1974 and 1975, gave further substance to Sadat's declared view that the United States held 99 percent of the cards in the Middle East.

The laborious process of step-by-step negotiations toward an Arab-Israeli peace settlement went forward

under strictly United States initiatives and auspices. The Soviet Union, although co-chairman with the United States of the Geneva conference set up after the war of 1973 as the international forum for a negotiated settlement, was little more than a spectator and not a very well informed spectator at that. Soviet leaders continued to voice support of the Arab cause against Israel, but the key Arab states—the “confrontation states” (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon) plus Saudi Arabia, on which the others depended for financial and political support—were all watching to see what the United States could and would do for them.

During those years Soviet-Egyptian relations continued to deteriorate, with Sadat providing most of the impetus. His main complaint was that Moscow had not provided and apparently would not provide the arms his country needed, and he accompanied these complaints with public speeches and interviews telling how Egypt had been deceived and let down by the Soviet Union in the past. Soviet leaders were visibly annoyed by these excursions into history, which did not incline them either to make new shipments of arms or to ease their terms of payment for arms delivered in the past. But they did not want a break with Egypt. They wanted to keep relations on a level that would permit them to revive if Sadat’s “American strategy” should fail and events take a new turn.

Keeping options open might seem to be in Egypt’s interest as well, but Sadat was not prepared to let the security treaty of 1971 remain as the basis for future relations with the Soviet Union. In March, 1976, he abrogated the treaty, saying it had become “nothing but a piece of paper.”<sup>14</sup> Thereafter the depth of Soviet hatred of Sadat was hardly disguised. In February, 1977, a press war developed between the two countries, with harsh charges and countercharges scarcely compatible with “normal” diplomatic relations. But there was one common interest. By mid-1977, both governments were saying that the time had come for the Geneva conference to meet.<sup>15</sup> Soviet leaders wanted to get into the diplomatic game, and the Egyptians, although still counting primarily on the United States, were not above using this means of prodding the Americans into more positive action.

## RESULTS OF THE WAR IN LEBANON

The fighting in Lebanon that began in the spring of 1975 and continued at an intensive level of fighting for over a year and a half was an obvious threat to the United States peacemaking effort and to the existing suspension of warfare between the Arab states and Israel. Lebanon might have seemed a promising place for the Kremlin to fish in troubled waters. But inter-

Arab politics in the Lebanese affair took their own course, not subject to prediction or direction from Moscow. The main problem was Syria.

For many years prior to the war of 1973, Syria had been the very model of a Soviet client state: radical and socialist in its ideology and political practice, wholly dependent on Moscow for its arms supply, open to Soviet advice and guidance, hostile to the West. Certain signs of greater independence became evident after Hafez al-Assad took power in 1971—he refused to enter into a security treaty similar to those Moscow concluded with Egypt in 1971 and with Iraq in 1972—but Syria still counted heavily on Soviet protection and support.

That support was crucial to Syria’s defense in the October war. Yet the war proved a turning point for Syria as it did for Egypt. Soviet weapons did not prevent the loss of still more territory to Israel, and Soviet diplomacy could not recover it. Syria’s only way to regain the newly lost territory and her only hope of eventual recovery of the Golan Heights lost in 1967 was a negotiated deal with Israel through the good offices of the United States. Hence Assad’s receptivity to Kissinger’s diplomatic approaches, his reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, and his conclusion of the interim arrangement with Israel in May, 1974.

Assad did not follow the example of Sadat in denouncing the Soviet Union and turning openly to the United States. He kept the line to Moscow in good order. Soviet arms kept flowing in. But by looking to the West for trade and even for arms and by broadening relations with other Arab states regardless of ideological differences, Syria gained a new flexibility and independence in her foreign policy.

Lebanon provided a test case. After first supporting the leftist groups and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) units against the Christian forces, Syria changed sides and ultimately intervened with her own army against the PLO. There were complex reasons for Syria’s intervention—the historic view of Lebanon as part of Syria, the fear of a revolutionary regime in Lebanon linked with Iraq, the need to control the PLO, the danger of war with Israel—but the important point was that Assad was acting in his country’s

(Continued on page 131)

<sup>14</sup>*The Washington Post*, March 15, 1976.

<sup>15</sup>Communiqué issued at the close of Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi’s visit to Moscow in June, 1977, *Pravda*, June 12, 1977.

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*"... the Kremlin may soon have to come to grips with the new realities that are emerging in a changing Europe. ... The challenge goes to the very heart of Moscow's imperial position."*

## Soviet Policy in Europe

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

*Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania*

EUROPE holds the key to the future of the Soviet Union and the United States. Each superpower seeks to encourage the evolution of its own kind of Europe, and many cold war tensions are generated over these competing conceptions. With all the attention being given détente, SALT, trade, technological transfers, competition in southern and eastern Africa—most of which relates primarily to the Soviet-American relationship—there is a tendency to forget that the cold war began in Europe; moreover, it is in Europe that the stakes in the Soviet-American rivalry are the greatest. Thus, even though the nations of Europe no longer play a vital international role, they have a significant effect on the long-range policies and outlooks of the superpowers.

The expansion of Soviet power into the center of Europe is the most important consequence of World War II. In analyzing Soviet policy toward East and West Europe, the Soviet Union's nuclear and missile capability and its enormous buildup of conventional forces must be remembered; and the Western powers must stay alert to the ever-present military threat posed by Soviet power. But beyond that there are underlying forces of complexity and intensity that defy easy explanation and complicate the formulation of foreign policy for both Soviet leaders and their counterparts in the West.

Soviet foreign policy gives pride of place to Europe. The Soviet Union consistently devotes more attention to developments in Europe than in any other region of the world. Not even China holds the same importance. Accordingly, it may be useful to examine the evolution of Soviet policy towards Europe, both East and West.

Three broad trends—national communism, Finlandization, and Eurocommunism—have given rise to distinctive developments, each of which has created new challenges for the Soviet leadership.

### NATIONAL COMMUNISM

The term national communism refers to a fusion of nationalism and communism in a political outlook and movement with a variety of forms, which seeks greater independence from Soviet military and ideological domination. In the context of East Europe, national

communism has three times given rise to a quest for autonomy unacceptable to Moscow: in Yugoslavia in 1948, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. No single explanation can fully explain national communism, which must be viewed in specific frameworks of historical and political circumstances.

National communism was an unanticipated consequence of Soviet domination. At the end of World War II, with the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union occupied Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and East Germany, installed pro-Moscow Communist parties in power, imposed Stalinist modes of government, and exploited these countries economically in order to rebuild its own devastated economy. The Sovietization and Stalinization of East Europe followed quickly. Moscow turned the region into a belt of cowed and compliant satellites. In addition, the presence of the Red Army in the center of Europe led West Europe to fear further Soviet expansion. This concern led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the subsequent remilitarization of the United States, especially after the Korean War.

By the time Joseph Stalin died in March, 1953, Europe had been polarized along political-ideological lines, and the Soviet imperium was unchallenged in the areas occupied by the Red Army. Yugoslavia and Albania had escaped a Soviet "liberation" in 1945, and as a result their indigenous Communist parties ruled free of Moscow's dictate. Although he was a disciple of Stalin's and the most truculently anti-Western of all the East European Communists, Yugoslav President Tito refused to turn Yugoslavia into a slavish satrapy of the Soviet Union, insisting instead that the Yugoslav Communist party be allowed to run its own show. Stalin tried to topple Tito by excommunicating Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc in June, 1948, but this ploy failed and "national communism" (originally called "Titoism") was born. Moscow then adopted harsh measures to expunge the Titoist heresy from East Europe and preserve its own unquestioned authority as leader of the world Communist movement.

A number of developments forced Stalin's successors to moderate the crude and exploitative aspects of Soviet



rule over East Europe. The struggle for power within the Soviet hierarchy prompted far-reaching policies to discard outmoded aspects of the Stalinist model of rule. Soviet leaders wanted to establish relations with their East European empire on a sounder and more efficient economic basis, while ensuring the political-military cohesion of the bloc. Soviet leaders also hoped to restore comradely relations with Yugoslavia. They began to emphasize "peaceful coexistence" with the West, trying to prevent West Germany's rearmament and integration into NATO and to encourage a withdrawal of American power from Europe. Growing frictions with Communist China also enhanced the need for a secure and reliable East Europe.

Inexorably, deStalinization led to differentiation and diversity. Moscow's power remained preeminent, but Soviet proposals were no longer unquestioningly accepted. Seeking to rule through consensus rather than coercion, the Soviet leadership found itself thwarted by East Europe's innate suspicion of Soviet intentions and the East European desire for increased autonomy. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, for example, sought to promote economic integration and planning for Soviet bloc members through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). He wanted to establish a "socialist international division of labor," in which each country in East Europe would specialize in certain commodities, in order to increase efficiency and reduce costs to COMECON members. But Khrushchev's economically rational proposal encountered considerable opposition from the Romanians and the Poles, in large part because they feared that economic integration would jeopardize their newly acquired autonomy and would bring them again under total Soviet authority. Thus, although there are sound economic reasons for promoting bloc integration and although a few joint projects, like the DRUZHBA natural gas line, have been completed, memories of the Stalin period and residual distrust of Moscow engender a continuing resistance. Furthermore, Moscow has tolerated, and on occasions even encouraged, the expansion of East European economic ties with the nations of West Europe, which has offered substantial credit for industrial purchases in the West. In this way, Moscow hopes the bloc will modernize its economies and become more of an economic asset.

Since May, 1955, the Soviet military presence in East Europe has been legitimized by the Warsaw Pact. Soviet leaders used their power in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to suppress what they regarded as threats to the Communist and Soviet-dominated character of the area. Thus, with an iron hand inside a velvet glove, the Soviet Union has kept the East Europeans in line. Romania, for example, has been

careful not to exceed the political parameters tolerated by Moscow. In a number of ways Romania has acted very much the maverick: developing friendly relations with Peking in the face of deteriorating Soviet relations with China; maintaining diplomatic and economic relations with Israel despite Moscow's contrary policy since June, 1967; encouraging large-scale Western (especially West German) investment while resisting integration within COMECON; refusing to participate in the Soviet-engineered invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by Warsaw Pact forces. But always, Romania's leadership has avoided provoking the Soviet leadership with internal liberalization or a direct challenge to Moscow's position in East Europe. The "Brezhnev Doctrine"—Moscow's assertion of its right to intervene anywhere in the "socialist" world to preserve "socialism"—has forced Romania and other bloc members to be careful not to overstep the bounds of autonomy set by Moscow.

Yet Soviet needs, bloc pressures and changes in the European environment and the international Communist movement require that Moscow constantly recalibrate the limits of East Europe's autonomy. Soviet military power in East Europe has never been greater, but Moscow finds its authority increasingly challenged and it faces its policy dilemmas with growing uneasiness. Can the Soviet Union continue to dole out bits of autonomy to satisfy pent-up nationalist desires without eroding the stability and cohesiveness of its "security community" in East Europe? How far can it go in encouraging economic ties between East and West Europe without relinquishing its own ambitions to form a viable economic community and without forcing a revamping of its own economic institutions and practices? At what point is national communism apt to become more national than Communist and therefore more anti-Soviet and more difficult to manage within a Moscow-controlled system?

## FINLANDIZATION

With due apologies to the Finns, we use the term "Finlandization," which has come to signify a process whereby the Soviet Union influences the domestic and foreign policy behavior of non-Communist countries in a way that leads them to follow policies congenial to, or approved by, the Soviet Union. The long-term Soviet objective is to dominate West Europe without having to use force. One British specialist puts the matter succinctly:<sup>1</sup>

Ideally, and in the longer term, the Soviet Union would like to work towards a Europe in which the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe was unchanged, but the whole of Western Europe had adopted a different political, military, and economic alignment. The Russians would like Western Europe to be made up of militarily weak nation-states, each spending very little on defence, and joined by no effective military alliance; they would like an end to the American military presence in Europe and the Mediterranean, and to existing American guarantees

<sup>1</sup>Malcolm MacKintosh, "Future Soviet Policy Towards Western Europe," in John C. Garnett, ed., *The Defence of Western Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 44.

to West European defence. They would like economic rivalry to replace cooperation, and an end to prospects of West European political cohesion or future integration.

As always, however, reality is more complex than the theories or conceptual formulations that seek to explain it. West Europe remains independent and NATO is still the keystone of the West European and United States security community. Economic integration and cooperation among the West European countries have progressed somewhat, though not nearly so much as its partisans had hoped. United States military commitments to the defense of West Europe seem secure; and the basic policies of the West European countries appear to be more a function of their domestic politics and inter-allied bargaining and bickering than of Soviet influence.

The West's disarray, which Moscow naturally tries to exploit, cannot be attributed to the Soviet Union. George F. Kennan, among others, has argued that the "Finlandization" of the West, if it should come to pass, would be the consequence of Western weakness, not Soviet strength. In his judgment, Soviet leaders are "not inclined towards major innovations of policy, particularly not risky or adventurous ones":

They [Soviet leaders] face many serious internal problems, and their whole motivation in external relations is basically defensive: defensive against the Chinese political attack, defensive against the disturbing implications of continued Western economic and technological superiority. It is absurd to picture these men as embarked on some new and dark plot to achieve the subjugation of, and the domination over, Western Europe. They are committed, to be sure, to a whole series of habitual postures, reactions, and rhetorical utterances that may appear to bear in that direction. But none of these manifestations of Soviet behavior are new; none are inspired by any belief in the possibility of their early success; and there are none that should be occasioning for Western statesmen any greater anxieties than they were experiencing—say—ten or fifteen years ago, before détente ever began to be talked about. . . .

Poor old West: succumbing feebly, day by day, to its own decadence, sliding into debility on the slime of its own self-indulgent permissiveness: its drugs, its crime, its pornography, its pampering of the youth, its addiction to its bodily comforts, its rampant materialism and consumerism—and then trembling before the menace of the wicked Russians, all pictured as supermen, eight feet tall, their internal problems all essentially solved, and with nothing else now to think about except how to bring damage and destruction to Western Europe. This persistent externalization of the sense of danger—this persistent externalization of the threat from without and blindness to the threat from within: this is the symptom of some deep failure to come to terms with reality—and

<sup>2</sup>George F. Kennan, "Are All Russians 8 Feet Tall . . . And Is the West Blind to the Threat from Within?" *Freedom At Issue*, no. 37 (September-October, 1976), p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>For example, see John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities," *Current History*, vol. 71, no. 420 (October, 1976), pp. 97 ff.

with one's self. If Western Europe could bring itself to think a little less about how defenseless it is in the face of the Russians, and a little more about what it is that it has to defend, I would feel more comfortable about its prospects for the future.<sup>2</sup>

These eloquent words deserve to be part of any discussion of Soviet objectives and policies.

But those who take a far less optimistic view of Soviet intentions in Europe maintain that the underestimation of Moscow's threat and of its multifaceted diplomacy, which seeks to undermine the West's will to resist, tends to discount important developments. Two may be cited. The chilling momentum underlying the Soviet military buildup of conventional forces in Europe has created an ominous imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO: today the theater warfare capability of Soviet infantry, tank corps, artillery, and logistical systems have all been greatly expanded and modernized.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, the Soviet Union gained a notable diplomatic triumph with the convening in Helsinki of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE on August 1, 1975. Moscow first proposed such a conference in 1954; its aims were Western recognition of the territorial division of Europe along post-1945 lines; international recognition of the East German regime; and acceptance of the Soviet sphere of influence in East Europe. These objectives were realized in 1975.

The critics of Helsinki contend that the agreement made Soviet borrowing from West European governments and firms easier, lowered the barriers to Soviet importation of much-needed advanced technology, gave Moscow additional leverage for playing off one Western country against another, and nurtured acceptance in the West of the permanence of Soviet power in the center of Europe.

Western defenders of the Final Act insist that Moscow paid a price for its gains. The Soviet Union agreed to honor the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states, and cooperation in humanitarian and cultural fields, including the freer movement of people and information, family reunification and visits, and educational exchanges—the so-called Basket Three provisions. If implemented, these principles would reduce tensions and would further perforate the "Iron Curtain" that has divided Europe for so many years.

As a result of the Helsinki accords, the U.S.S.R. has also agreed to give prior notice of large-scale troop maneuvers. This "confidence-building" measure is a step in the direction of easing tensions. The manifestations of dissidence in Poland and Czechoslovakia and to some extent even in Romania and East Germany suggest that Basket Three provisions could become a problem for Moscow, further complicating its exercise of authority over a restive East Europe. Soviet concern can be seen in its vehement attacks on the "imperialist

circles" that lead the campaign for human rights and in its attempts to fashion a unified bloc position at the June, 1977, meeting in Belgrade preparatory to the formal conference that is to come.

The record of Soviet efforts to "Finlandize" West Europe remains to be written. The Soviet leaders face several dilemmas. How far can they reduce tensions and thereby encourage a reduced United States military presence in Europe without occasioning intolerable demands for autonomy from their East European client states? Would a weak and dependent West Europe lobby for a greater United States presence, which Moscow seeks to forestall? Can Moscow exploit nationalism and national animosities in the West and, at the same time, nurture integration and regional cooperation in East Europe? If Moscow uses its muscle to change West European policies, as for example in trying to prevent the organizers of Italy's prestigious Venice Biennale from exhibiting the works of East European dissident artists, or proscribing West European contacts with Soviet dissidents, may it not reinforce the position of partisans of a stronger NATO, who will cite such interference as a harbinger of things to come?

#### EUROCOMMUNISM

The phenomenon of "Eurocommunism," about which so much is being written nowadays, refers to the entry of West European Communist parties into the political mainstreams of their respective countries and their professed commitment to an evolutionary quest for power and a readiness to share office in coalition with non-Communist parties. As exemplified in the statements of leaders of the Italian, French and Spanish Communist parties, Eurocommunism also includes independence from Soviet ideological and political domination; rejection of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and acceptance of the principles underlying Western pluralist democratic societies, including free elections, toleration of competing parties and respect for fundamental civil liberties and majority rule. Eurocommunism may be considered to have taken shape in mid-November, 1975, with the manifesto issued in Rome by the Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer and his French counterpart, Georges Marchais, in which they gave their support "for the plurality of political parties, for the right to existence and activity of opposition parties, and for democratic alternation between the majority and the minority."<sup>4</sup>

Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the recently legalized Spanish Communist party, has been the most outspoken in staking out a maverick position on the relationship between a West European Communist

party and the Soviet Union. In an interview in February, 1976, with the Milan newspaper *Corriere della sera*, he declared himself not worried at the prospect of Soviet condemnation of heretical centers of communism:

By what right could they condemn us? They can criticize us, as we criticize them. Condemnation is excommunication from a church, and the Communist movement was a church but now no longer is one.<sup>5</sup>

On another occasion, the Spanish Communist equated democracy with Western democracy and "not a people's democracy as in Eastern Europe"; furthermore, he said:

I mistrust the Russians as much as you do. We have to keep United States bases in Spain for a while. Certainly, as long as Russia has bases in Czechoslovakia, the U.S.A. should have bases in Spain.<sup>6</sup>

What all this means for Soviet foreign policy is far from clear. Moscow has no way of exercising direct control over any West European Communist party. It must tolerate criticism and try through persuasion to fashion a consensus that leaves Soviet leadership more or less intact in the international Communist movement — and especially in East Europe.

Moscow has been unable to gain unquestioned acceptance of its ideological and political preeminence. In 1974 and 1975, it failed to win over key leaderships of European Communist parties. The Yugoslavs, the Romanians, the Italians and the French, among others, were unwilling to accept the "leading" position of the Soviet party and insisted on equality for all parties. At the twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in March, 1976, Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev hoped for agreement to the principle of "proletarian internationalism" (the euphemism for Moscow's leadership), but he backed down in the face of widespread opposition. And at the Conference of European Communist Parties, held in East Berlin on June 29 and 30, 1976 — the first such international gathering that Yugoslav President Tito attended since Stalin excommunicated him from the Cominform in June, 1948, — the Soviets had to accept a document that said "there is no leading center of international communism."

Polemics and political opportunism aside, Soviet  
(Continued on page 132)

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<sup>4</sup>Kevin Devlin, "The Challenge of Eurocommunism," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 26, no. 1 (January-February, 1977), p. 9.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup>*The New York Times*, April 23, 1977.



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*"Brezhnev has . . . ascended the Everest of Soviet political power. . . . Ironically, while the political Brezhnev is thus exalted, the flesh-and-blood Brezhnev is decadent; he takes on unlimited political powers and new responsibilities as his abilities wane."*

## Brezhnev's Year: Politics in the U.S.S.R.

BY ROBERT G. WESSON

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**I**N recent years, the Soviet political scene has generally been monotonously placid, with hardly any signs of the kind of controversy that bubbled up during the reign of the ebullient Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The aging oligarchs have remained fixed in place, with few and unspectacular promotions and few demotions from top ranks (those removed have been generally among the juniors). From October, 1964, to May, 1977, the oligarchic coterie that overthrew Khrushchev remained intact. The chief visible trend has been the gradually increasing primacy of Leonid Brezhnev.

A cabal forced Khrushchev out in October, 1964, apparently mostly because he made them uncomfortable. What followed seemed to be a truly collective leadership (resembling the leadership for a time after the departures of Lenin and Stalin), in which no single individual stood much above his several colleagues. But the man who had the strongest control of the reins of the party, the Secretary of the Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, was gradually able to forward his supporters and remove rivals or potential rivals from power. By 1970, Brezhnev was the chief Soviet negotiator, although he apparently had to consult closely with the Politburo. The 1971 party congress was largely Brezhnev's show. More pictures of him kept appearing and quotations from his speeches became more frequent. The cult of his personality came to surpass that of Khrushchev at its height, and the 1976 party congress treated him almost as deferentially as congresses treated Stalin. His seventieth birthday, December 19, 1976, brought an imperial show of tribute to the great man. He was called *vozhd*, like Lenin and Stalin before him, the Russian equivalent of the German *Fuehrer* or Italian *Duce*. Six pages of *Pravda* (expanded to eight for the occasion) were filled with adulatory articles and speeches, and other papers were proportionally dedicated. In the following week, one page daily (out of four or six) in the newspapers was filled with congratulatory messages. Brezhnev received a sword of honor and the highest decorations of the Soviet Union. A full-length documentary of his career was released, in which the 40

years of Stalin and Khrushchev were elided and Brezhnev seemed almost the direct successor of Lenin. A Brezhnev photographic album was published, and collections of his utterances, in print and on records, were made available to the admiring, if not awestruck citizenry.

The master of ceremonies at the Brezhnev birthday festivities was Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Soviet Union, that is, formally, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Podgorny did not earn enduring gratitude, however. On May 24, 1977, it was announced that he had been relieved of membership in the governing Politburo. He was far the most senior figure to be ousted since Khrushchev. The action was brusque, with no suggestion of age, ill health, desire to retire, or services rendered — Podgorny had been a Politburo member for 17 years and President since December, 1965 (when he was nominated by Brezhnev), and had seemed in recent years frequently to rank next to Brezhnev. He was even permitted, like Brezhnev, to have his bronze bust in his hometown in the Ukraine.

Podgorny's removal was foreshadowed by no apparent loss of stature. Just two months earlier, he had made an extensive and apparently successful tour of black Africa, the first Soviet leader to do so. On May 20, he had publicly received President Urho Kekkonen of Finland, and on May 23 he sent a congratulatory message for President Tito's eighty-fifth birthday. But after May 24, decrees which should have been his were signed by a deputy, his name ceased to be published, his picture disappeared, and he joined the ranks of Soviet nonpersons.

Communist leaders in East Europe asked Western reporters to explain the ouster; but in view of the extreme and apparently increasing secrecy of Soviet politics, informed observers could only speculate. Some thought that he had been too tough on foreign and domestic policy for Brezhnev; and perhaps that he wanted to become more deeply involved in Africa. However, differences, if they were real, had never been sharply expressed. Podgorny had been something of a rival for

Brezhnev in the last Khrushchev years and the rivalry apparently continued quietly afterward. But Podgorny, who as a Ukrainian was probably disqualified for the top spot in any case, seemed to accept secondary status in good grace. It may have been to Podgorny's discredit that, although four years older than Brezhnev, he was considerably more vigorous. Brezhnev possibly saw Podgorny as a rival with an independent power base, as a potential danger or successor, if Brezhnev's condition continued to deteriorate.

There must have been a sharp clash. Ordinary procedure has invariably been to drop a man from his main government or outside job first, and only months later to expel him from the Politburo. The reversal of the order indicates that Podgorny was even more humiliated than those who preceded him from the Politburo into oblivion. The most probable explanation seems to be simple: Brezhnev wished to add to his glory by making himself head of state as well as party boss, thereby becoming by protocol what he had been de facto—a satisfaction especially in dealing with foreign statesmen and receiving full honors on foreign tours. Podgorny apparently declined to vacate the post voluntarily, so he was booted out in dishonor.

### A NEW CONSTITUTION

The expectation that Brezhnev would make himself chief of state was strengthened by the announcement, when Podgorny was expelled, of the forthcoming publication of the new Soviet draft constitution, which finally appeared on June 4. In 1961, Khrushchev had announced that the 1936 constitution established under Stalin should be replaced, and a drafting commission was set up. After Khrushchev's ouster, the commission was headed by Brezhnev. On several occasions, it was supposed to produce the fruit of its long labors, but there must have been enough disagreement to postpone publication year after year. However, by 1977 Brezhnev was apparently in a position to override any dissension and to present what is perhaps to be his greatest monument, the new constitution, reflecting the condition of "developed socialism" in the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is to be called the "Brezhnev constitution," as its predecessor was for two decades called the "Stalinist constitution."

The draft clearly bears Brezhnev's imprint but changes are mostly cosmetic and so slight as to suggest that it is called a new constitution for propaganda reasons. The most significant change is clearly tailored for Brezhnev: the powers of the head of state (and the Presidium under him) are expanded to make him overseer of the administration; and he is provided with a deputy, presumably to handle routine affairs. Other changes seem designed to underline already effective policies and positions, statements, so to speak, of the condition of the Soviet state and its avowed aims.

For example, a declarative section on foreign policy is the most distinctive new feature. It has no specific effect, but sets forth the generalized Soviet stand on international affairs as the leadership sees it. It expresses the aims of creating favorable conditions for communism and strengthening the position of socialism in the world, of supporting "national liberation," of preventing war, and of building on "peaceful coexistence." It consecrates principles agreed to at Helsinki on the non-use of force, territorial integrity, and the like. At the same time, it implicitly sanctions intervention abroad in the name of socialist internationalism, as practiced in Czechoslovakia in 1968. To stand back now, if "socialism" were endangered in East Europe, would be contrary to the constitution.

The section on rights is similarly expressive of the non-unity of theory and practice. On the one hand, *Pravda* has boasted that the rights of Soviet citizens were substantially expanded over the already impressive list in the old constitution. To the amenities to which Soviet citizens are entitled are added health care and housing. The people are promised the right to use not only the press but also radio and television, although access to printing presses is dropped. The privacy of telephone and telegraphic communication is promised. The new constitution also provides, however, that "The exercise of rights and liberties by citizens must not cause damage to the interests of society. . . ." There is a long list of duties, including defense of the interests of the state, observance of labor discipline and intolerance of antisocial behavior; and the implementation of rights is made inseparable from the fulfillment of duties. The practical reality is exemplified not only by the notorious bugging of Soviet telephones but by the law that makes it a crime to use the telephone to the detriment of state interests. In sum, Soviet dissidents will hardly be able to claim constitutional rights in the future, as they have often done, with only moral effect, in the past.

The new constitution furthermore spells out in much stronger language the ruling position of the Communist party. Stalin's constitution mentioned the Communist party as "the vanguard of the working people." By the new draft, "The Communist party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of its political system, of all state and public organizations . . . [it] exists for the people and serves the people." In another new provision, which changes nothing but which underlines the practice of the Brezhnev government, it is promised that, to ensure the defense of the country, the state will furnish the armed forces with everything they need.

The draft constitution also reflects the long-standing policy of gradually reducing the status of the minority republics. There is no dramatic transformation, but various provisions reflect "the strengthening of all-Union principles," as Brezhnev put it in his report to the Central Committee. The anomalous and unrealistic right of the republics to secede was retained, con-

trary to the expectations of many; but it was countered by an article holding that "the territory of the U.S.S.R. is united and includes the territory of the Union republics." Another article spells out rights of the central government over the republics even more broadly than heretofore, including power over their organization and activity and general authority to legislate for the entire Union.

The new constitution is to be praised and discussed at countless meetings across the Soviet Union, at which amendments may be proposed; but it will probably be rubber-stamped without consequential changes by the Supreme Soviet in time for the November 7 sixtieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Nonetheless, Brezhnev did not wait for the constitution to come into effect; on June 16 he had himself elected President. This was a position he held previously under Khrushchev, from May, 1960, to June, 1964. In 1960, however, the presidency was a setback in his contest for second place with Frol Kozlov, Khrushchev's heir-apparent. When he became ceremonial President in 1960, Brezhnev lost his position of power on the Secretariat of the Central Committee. When Kozlov became incapacitated in 1964, Brezhnev regained his secretaryship, relinquished the largely ceremonial presidency, and found himself in line to succeed Khrushchev.

Now, however, to don the hat of President, in addition to those of General Secretary, chief of the defense council, and marshal, is to make his status as boss virtually complete. The only top office he does not hold is the premiership.

Brezhnev is the first top Soviet leader to assume the presidency, which was occupied by nonentities until 1960, when Brezhnev himself during his earlier tenure vested it with some importance. Lenin was only Politburo member and Premier, and Stalin took the premiership in the fullness of his power in 1941. So did Khrushchev in 1958, when he had bested his chief rivals. Consequently, the joining of the positions of General Secretary (or First Secretary) of the party and Premier, or head of administration, has betokened dictatorship.

Hence, in the general acceptance of collective leadership after Khrushchev was toppled, it was agreed among the oligarchs and ratified by the Central Committee that no one should combine the leading secretaryship and the premiership. The rule held, and for a few years it seemed as though Premier Alexei Kosygin was almost an equal partner of Brezhnev—theirs was referred to as the "Brezhnev-Kosygin" regime. As Kosygin, who was primarily an administrator and never a candidate for supremacy, lost ground and Brezhnev became the center of a personality cult exceeding that of Khrushchev, it was several times rumored that Brezhnev might take over the premiership. He was perhaps deterred by the rule or by a disinclination to assume a greater administrative workload. In any case, he solved the problem neatly by assuming the formally elevated title of Presi-

dent in connection with the new constitution, making the Premier subordinate.

In accepting the post, Brezhnev spoke modestly of his sacrifice:

The discharge of the lofty and responsible state functions connected with this, parallel with the duties of General Secretary of our party's Central Committee, is, of course, no easy matter. But the will of the party, the will of the Soviet people, the interests of our socialist homeland have always been for me the supreme law to which I subordinated and subordinate my entire life.

Combination of the roles of party leader and state chief also confirmed, in Brezhnev's words, the fact that the party "has determined and will determine the key questions of state life." Incidentally, Brezhnev implied that Podgorny had been insufficiently cooperative with strictly party leadership, that is, with Brezhnev. Announcing the new constitution and apparently aware that this accumulation of offices would raise fears of dictatorship, Brezhnev reassured his people a few days earlier by taking a slap, almost for the first time, at the excesses of Stalinism: "The party strongly condemned such practices and they must never be repeated."

The joining of the top positions in a single person clearly represents, however, an affirmation of authoritarianism, if not autocracy, just as truly collective leadership suggests something approaching constitutionalism, or at the least, restrictions on the arbitrary power of a single individual. The assumption of state powers by the party leader has apparently proved useful, or at least unavoidable, in Communist countries generally. In all Soviet bloc countries except Hungary and Poland, and also in China, Yugoslavia, Cuba and North Korea, the top party figure is the official head of state, or in some cases Premier; and Brezhnev explicitly said that, in drawing up the new constitution, "account was taken of the experience of the constitutional development of fraternal socialist states."

## FORMAL AUTHORITY

The new constitution represents a regularization of the Soviet system, which has been in a sense an autocracy without a proper autocratic office; in the Marxist vision, after all, the state was to die away in the triumph of the new social order. Lenin was for the most part simply the accepted and indispensable leader. Stalin built up the position of first Party Secretary, which had been unimportant before he took the title, and made

(Continued on page 132)

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"Unlike previous KGB campaigns [against dissidents], which primarily sought to isolate or punish key activists, the thrust of the latest campaign has been to disrupt the communication channel that runs from the dissidents through the Western press corps in Moscow to American and European media and back into the Soviet Union via British and American Russian-language broadcasts."

# Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union

BY ROBERT SHARLET

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As the Soviet Union approaches the sixtieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Communist regime finds itself locked, in a dialectical struggle with a tiny, loosely knit group of dissidents. Past repression has engendered fresh dissidence which, in turn, has evoked still more repression, as the Communist party leadership has reacted coercively to the challenges and demands of a numerically small group of discontented and articulate citizens ranging from religious zealots to modern technocrats.<sup>1</sup>

Fortunately for the regime, there has been little cohesion among the diverse groups that make up the broad dissident movement and little discernible connection between dissidents and the mass of the population. As a result, the struggle has been an uneven contest between a powerful party-state monopolizing the instruments of coercion and communication and the few thousand activist but disparate dissidents who, at any given time during the past decade, have chosen the path of peaceful confrontation with the regime. And yet the dialectical tension between the opposing forces goes on.

What have the dissidents been seeking? The techno-

crats tend to advocate liberal reforms; intellectuals, greater creative freedom; the ethnic Ukrainians, more national autonomy; Georgian nationalists, attention to their indigenous cultural heritage. Religious dissenters, from Russian Baptists to Lithuanian Catholics, demand freedom of conscience, while numerous Soviet Jews have sought the right to emigrate.<sup>2</sup> Broadly, the spectrum of demands divides into two general categories—those involving instrumental or pragmatic changes in the Soviet system (e.g., Andrei Sakharov and the scientific and literary dissidents who form the human rights or "democratic" wing of the dissident movement); and those entailing humanistic concessions of an absolutist nature (e.g., the various religious dissenters whose belief systems are antithetical to the party's official ideology and who reject from the outset its "scientific atheism").<sup>3</sup>

During the past ten years or more, the regime's repressive measures have run the gamut from job dismissal to penal incarceration. While the leadership has formulated general policies, it has delegated to the secret police (KGB) the task of coordinating the regime's strategic counteroffensive against dissent and directing its various tactical campaigns against particular groups.<sup>4</sup> Thus the dialectic has been joined; dissidence has been met by the counterforce of political justice, meted out administratively in an infinite variety of bureaucratic harassments or through the more routinized medium of judicial process. Either way, those individuals bold enough to criticize the Soviet system or, in rare instances, to demonstrate publicly against a particular policy, have invariably suffered deprivations of one kind or another. And almost predictably, fresh recruits have come forward to protest each new wave of repression and continue the advocacy of the cause, be it reform, religion, ethnic nationalism, or emigration.

## MAINSTREAM DISSIDENCE

The seeds of contemporary Soviet dissidence were sown by the post-Stalin, post-mobilization modernization process. Self-consciousness increased; specialization of interests developed; and the fragmentation of

<sup>1</sup>See Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Dissent* (Spring, 1976), pp. 136-54; Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union* (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972); and Abraham Brumberg, ed., *In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

<sup>2</sup>For the spectrum of dissent, see F. J. M. Feldbrugge, *Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union* (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1975); Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR* (New York: Free Press, 1976); and Irina Kirk, *Profiles in Russian Resistance* (New York: Quadrangle, 1975).

<sup>3</sup>Adapted from Rudolf L. Tokes' useful typology. See his "Dissent: The Politics for Change in the USSR," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tokes, eds., *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's* (New York: Free Press, 1974), ch. 1.

<sup>4</sup>See Barghoorn, "The Post-Khrushchev Campaign to Suppress Dissent: Perspectives, Strategies, and Techniques of Repression," in Rudolf L. Tokes, ed., *Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology and People* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), ch. 1.

the mobilized society began.<sup>5</sup> Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's policy of deStalinization raised expectations of systemic change in some parts of the population, and the seeds of dissent took root in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Largely because the deStalinization program was never completed and the expectations of change were for the most part unfulfilled, dissent flourished in the Soviet Union, becoming a hardy perennial in the 1970's. Why has the Soviet regime failed to silence the voices of dissent? The answer lies in the dialectic of dissidence and repression.

Although the conviction of the nonconformist poet Iosif Brodsky for "parasitism" in 1964 aroused the concern of liberal Soviet intellectuals and drew some attention in the West,<sup>6</sup> it was the Siniavsky-Daniel trial in early 1966 that produced the first well-known martyr and provided a major impetus to the public expression of dissidence.<sup>7</sup> While Brodsky's poetry had been essentially apolitical and therefore offensive to the canons of "socialist realism," the prose of Andrei Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel, which circulated in *samizdat* (unauthorized underground publications) and was published in the West under the pseudonyms "Tertz" and "Arzhak," was political satire and totally unacceptable.

Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's regime responded with what was to become the first of a series of political trials of the dissident intelligentsia. Siniavsky and Daniel were brought to trial under Article 70 of the reformed Criminal Code of the Russian Republic of 1960, a "political" article proscribing sedition or "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."<sup>8</sup> But this required proof of "intent," and the bulk of the "evidence" were the words of fictional characters. However, this did not present an insurmountable problem; Daniel, for instance, was held criminally liable for creating in one of his stories the fiction of the Soviet government proclaiming a "Public Murder Day."<sup>9</sup>

Both defendants consistently responded to such bizarre literary-judicial equations by reminding the court that it was erroneous to impute to an author his characters' views. However, this line of defense was to no avail. Both writers were found guilty and sentenced to long terms, but this outcome was a pyrrhic victory for the regime. Instead of demonizing the "anti-Soviet" authors, intimidating like-minded writers and destroying literary dissidence at one blow, the trial was seen as a manifestation of neo-Stalinism and evoked a wave of protest from Soviet liberal intellectuals and the Western literati.<sup>10</sup>

In the U.S.S.R. petitions and critical letters signed by prominent literary figures and even by some scientists were dispatched to party authorities, government offices and newspapers and to official writers' organizations. Documents on the case and the protest were compiled, circulated in *samizdat* and sent to the West. Even some West European Communist parties disassociated themselves from the trial, a harbinger of their later reaction to Soviet repression. In March, 1966, less than a month after the verdict, a group of young Soviet intellectuals attempted to stage an anti-Stalin rally in Red Square, an extraordinary act of political defiance by Soviet standards.

The Soviet leadership reacted by strengthening its legal defenses against dissent. To facilitate prosecution of the burgeoning number of active dissidents, the government amended its criminal law in the fall of 1966, adding Article 190, Sections 1 and 3 to the RSFSR Code. Aptly dubbed the "Siniavsky-Daniel law," the new amendments made the circulation of *samizdat* materials and participation in unauthorized public demonstrations punishable offenses.<sup>11</sup>

The stage was set for the recurring cycle of repression and dissent. Beginning in 1967, new political trials were mounted against those most strident in their protest against the Siniavsky-Daniel trial. Each new trial in turn brought forth fresh streams of dissent, which flowed into the swelling mainstream of the dissident movement of the late 1960's. Although there have been periods when one side or the other—regime or dissidents—seemed to have their opponents on the defensive, the dialectic of dissent and repression remained unbroken.

Vital to the staying power of the dissidents is the fact that most major political trials of the mainstream dissenters have been surreptitiously documented and thereby widely publicized, including: the Pushkin Square Case of 1967, the Siniavsky-Daniel "White Book" Case of 1968, the Red Square Case of 1968, the Amalrik Case of 1970, the Bukovsky Case of 1972, the Chronicle Case of 1973, the Kovalev Case of 1975 and the Tverdokhlebov Case of 1976. Unofficial transcripts of these cases have been regularly smuggled to the West, translated and published, keeping the face of Soviet political justice constantly visible abroad.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>5</sup>See Walter D. Connor, "Differentiation, Integration, and Political Dissent in the USSR," in *ibid.*, ch. 4.

<sup>6</sup>See "The Trial of Iosif Brodsky: A Transcript," *The New Leader* (August 31, 1964), pp. 6-17.

<sup>7</sup>For the unofficial trial transcript, see Max Hayward, ed., *On Trial: The Soviet State versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak,"* revised and enlarged ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 37-195.

<sup>8</sup>For the text of Art. 70, see Harold J. Berman, trans. and ed., *Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 153-54.

<sup>9</sup>See the exchange between the judge and Daniel in Hayward, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, appendix, pp. 284-301.

<sup>11</sup>See Berman, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-83; and pp. 180-81 (Art. 190, sections 1 and 3).

<sup>12</sup>See e.g., Pavel Litvinov, *The Demonstration on Pushkin Square* (London: Collins/Harvill, 1969); and most recently, "Andrei Tverdokhlebov's Trial," in Valery Chalidze, ed., *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR* (New York: Khronika Press), no. 20-21 (April-June, 1976), pp. 8-12.

Governments, intellectuals, Communist parties, and international organizations in the West have been the indispensable "external" audience for the mainstream dissidents. The dissidents' principal strategy, either in court or in the psychiatric clinic, has been to adopt a "legalist" defense against the political arbitrariness of the authorities, a defense to which the West with its traditional commitment to the "rule of law" has been especially responsive.

In the counteroffensive launched by the regime after the protest over the fate of Siniavsky and Daniel, it soon became apparent that (increased respect for "socialist legality" notwithstanding) *partiinnost'* (party-orientation) superseded *zakonnost'* (legality) in political cases. Most major political trials were planned "off-stage" and orchestrated by high level party organs in collaboration with the KGB. Although the post-Stalin generation of political defendants rarely "cooperated" with its persecutors, the government's cases were nevertheless carefully staged; the verdicts were foreordained, and little latitude was left to legal personnel except an occasional opportunity to decide sentences within a narrowly predetermined range. Acquittal was out of the question.

In addition, political defendants were not accorded the procedural "due process" rights that have been enjoyed by ordinary criminal defendants since the reform and recodification of Soviet criminal procedural law in the late 1950's and early 1960's. On the contrary, in the past decade the regime has frequently and flagrantly violated due process requirements in its political prosecutions.

Knowing that they could not affect the outcome of their trials, mainstream dissidents in the dock have concentrated on a proceduralist defense, putting "socialist legality" itself on trial. Thus, as the unofficial court transcripts went into *samizdat* circulation, each new trial became another indictment of the regime's denial of human rights and the basis for fresh protests,

<sup>13</sup>"A Letter from Vladimir Bukovsky," *New York Review of Books* (March 9, 1972), p. 4. See also Valery Chalidze, *To Defend These Rights: Human Rights and the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1974).

<sup>14</sup>See Tatyana Khodorovich, ed., *The Case of Leonid Plyushch* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1976) and *The Grigorenko Papers: Writings by General P. G. Grigorenko and Documents on His Case* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1976).

<sup>15</sup>See Andrei D. Sakharov, *Sakharov Speaks* (New York: Knopf, 1974).

<sup>16</sup>See, e.g., Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine* (New York: Praeger, 1971) and most recently Vyacheslav Chornovil, "My Trial," *Index on Censorship*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring, 1976), pp. 57-69.

<sup>17</sup>See most recently, "The Trial of Mustafa Dzhemilev," in Chalidze, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-20.

<sup>18</sup>See Barbara Wolfe Jancar, "Religious Dissent in the Soviet Union," in Tokes, ed., *Dissent in the USSR*, ch. 6.

<sup>19</sup>See William Korey, *The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia* (New York: Viking, 1973).

keeping the Brezhnev regime on the defensive at home and in the eyes of Western public opinion. "Legalism" has been employed not just as a courtroom defense and as the basis for post-trial protest, but also as an affirmative form of dissent and a component of the mainstream dissidents' drive for the implementation of human rights. While the theorist of "legalism" has been the physicist Valery Chalidze, Vladimir Bukovsky, who joined him in the West last December, has been the master practitioner of legal criticism as defense and dissent.<sup>13</sup>

Legalism has its limits, however, in the regime's abuse of psychiatry for political purposes. Particularly troublesome dissidents like General P. G. Grigorenko and Leonid Plyushch have been expeditiously committed to mental institutions and subjected to pharmacological "terror" in the form of unnecessary but disabling injections. The most effective defense against psychiatric repression has been either a medical or a political campaign, usually from the West, to rescue the prisoner-patient.<sup>14</sup> Conversely, the tributaries of ethnic and religious dissent flowing into the mainstream dissident movement have demonstrated that repression, too, has its limits. Much of this dissidence occurs in provincial towns and cities far from the view of the international media; nonetheless Andrei Sakharov and the human rights group in Moscow have been especially helpful in publicizing these causes and the regime's reactions, both within the movement and abroad.<sup>15</sup>

Deeply rooted in the ethnic past and catalyzed by the modernization process, the nationality problem in the U.S.S.R. has been aptly termed a "time bomb" buried in Soviet society; it probably represents the most dangerous difficulty facing the regime in coming decades. Ukrainian dissidence<sup>16</sup> and, to a lesser extent, Crimean Tatar nationalism<sup>17</sup> have been the most visible manifestations of ethnic dissent. Both these groups have been resistant to wave after wave of particularly draconian repression, as nationality dissent with its enduring qualities steadily outlasts each attempt to destroy it. In the near future, the regime faces another entrenched problem in religious dissent, which flourishes in an astonishing variety in the U.S.S.R. and which, in some forms, may be explosive.<sup>18</sup>

Because of its intensity, its appeal to ordinary people and its potential for taking on a mass character, religious dissidence has long been an object of repression in the Soviet Union, although to no avail. Religious dissent has survived each new persecution. Witness the situation in Lithuania, where the highly combustible mixture of religious and ethnic dissidence has produced considerable anti-Soviet militancy and, in spite of all efforts to repress it, has actually grown in strength.

Finally, the Soviet Jewish emigration movement reflects a unique blend of rising ethnic and religious consciousness and the limits of repression in the U.S.S.R.<sup>19</sup> In spite of the regime's special campaigns and variable



techniques to discourage emigration, the dialectic of repression and the desire to emigrate has maintained an unceasing momentum. Bureaucratic harassment has not worked; grandiose political trials have proven counterproductive;<sup>20</sup> and the more recent perversions of the criminal justice process have failed to intimidate Soviet Jews and stem the flow.<sup>21</sup> The Jewish emigration movement has confronted the Soviet leadership with the dilemma inherent in the relentless dialectic—if the regime is responsive, an undesirable precedent is set for other disaffected minorities; conversely, repression tends to create more militancy, which arouses the West, further tarnishing the Soviet Union's human rights image abroad.

In the summer of 1975, the dissident movement drew renewed encouragement from the "Final Act" of the 35-nation European Conference on Security and Cooperation held in Helsinki. By signing this document, the Soviet Union committed itself to help foster the freer flow of information and persons across national boundaries. Responding to this public commitment on the part of the regime, the dissident movement set up Helsinki "watch groups" in 1976. These "watch groups" were established by coalitions of mainstream, ethnic and religious activists in Moscow, Kiev, Vilnius and Tbilisi and in Soviet Armenia to report through *samizdat* on Soviet compliance with the human rights pledges of the Helsinki conference. By early 1977, numerous reports of Soviet violations filed by the Helsinki monitors were circulating in *samizdat* and finding their way to the West.<sup>22</sup>

### THE "BELGRADE CAMPAIGN"

These monitoring groups have become the primary targets of strong counterattacks during the current KGB "Belgrade campaign," which has apparently been undertaken for several reasons, including a policy

decision to reduce visible dissidence in the Soviet Union prior to the June and October, 1977, meetings in Belgrade to review compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Accords, including the human rights provisions. (The timing of the current campaign, keyed to a significant event in East-West relations, resembles the KGB crackdown on dissidents in 1972-1973 both before and after United States President Richard Nixon's visit to Moscow in May, 1972).

The Moscow "watch group," except for Sakharov who remains "untouchable," has been decimated by arrests, intimidation and encouragement to emigrate, beginning with the arrests of Alexander Ginzburg and Yuri Orlov in February, 1977. Similarly, the Helsinki "watch group" in Kiev has been effectively suppressed, and its leaders, Mykola Rudenko and Oleska Tikhy, were sentenced to long terms in June, 1977.<sup>23</sup>

In Soviet Georgia, where Georgian and Jewish dissidents formed a "watch group" in January, 1977, the leader of the Georgians, the literary scholar Zviad Gamsakhurdia, has since been arrested. Following an unsuccessful attempt to compromise the group through an agent-provocateur last spring, the leader of the Jewish dissidents, the scientist Grigory Goldstein, was summoned for questioning by the KGB, possibly as a prelude to his arrest or in connection with building a "case" against Goldstein's imprisoned Georgian co-leader.<sup>24</sup>

Information about each of these repressive measures was circulated in *samizdat* and reached the West before and during the preliminary meeting in Belgrade in June, 1977, to prepare the agenda for the fall meeting.

Activist Soviet Jews have also been the object of the KGB's "Belgrade campaign." During the 1976 presidential election campaign in the United States, groups of Jews whose attempts to emigrate had been frustrated conducted public demonstrations and even "sit-ins" in government buildings in Moscow to dramatize the official slowdown of emigration, which has dropped from a high point of 35,000 in 1973 to the low point of between 13,000 and 14,000 annually in 1975 and 1976. Soviet authorities reacted to these "provocations" predictably, but their overall response was tempered by the leadership's sensitivity to the American electoral process. With the election over, the regime felt less inhibited and in March, 1977, Anatoly Shcharansky, a leading Jewish dissident and liaison to the mainline dissenters, was arrested.

As a variant in the current anti-dissident campaign, the Western press corps in Moscow, which naturally has been the conduit for much of the *samizdat* material reaching the West, has come under sharp official attack. Thus George Krinsky of the Associated Press was expelled in February, 1977, and other reporters were harassed. Keynoting the "Belgrade campaign" in a March, 1977, speech, Brezhnev conspicuously criticized dissenters and vigorously defended the policy of re-

<sup>20</sup>See Rene Beermann, "The 1970-71 Soviet Trials of Zionists: Some Legal Aspects," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, no. 2 (November, 1971), pp. 3-24.

<sup>21</sup>See Telford Taylor et al., *Courts of Terror: Soviet Criminal Justice and Jewish Emigration* (New York: Random House, 1976); and Robert Sharlet, "Samizdat as a Source for the Study of Soviet Law," *Soviet Union*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1974), esp. pp. 189-92.

<sup>22</sup>The first "watch group" was organized in Moscow on May 12, 1976. See Chalidze, *Chronicle*, no. 20-21 (April-June, 1976), pp. 5-8. For the latest "watch group" reports to reach the West, see *ibid.*, no. 25 (January-March, 1977), pp. 37-50. For a review of "watch group" activities and their repression, see The White House's *Second Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* submitted June 3, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 4-5.

<sup>23</sup>For a summary of these arrests, see Chalidze, *Chronicle*, no. 25 (January-March, 1977), pp. 7-11.

<sup>24</sup>See Reddaway, "How the KGB Tried to Hoax Georgian Dissidents," *The Times* (London), July 6, 1977, p. 16; and his earlier article "The KGB in Georgia," *New York Review of Books* (March 31, 1977), p. 35.

pressing them as "not only our right but our sacred duty."

The "Belgrade campaign" differed from the KGB's 1972-1973 "Nixon campaign" in several ways. First, although the regime's past practice was not to acknowledge the problem of dissidence publicly, Brezhnev's well-publicized attack in March was a clear signal of a rather quick turnaround on this policy. Just the previous year, at the twenty-fifth party congress in February, 1976, Brezhnev had confined himself to an oblique and brief reference to dissent and its legal repression at the end of his lengthy opening speech.<sup>25</sup>

Second, the regime seems to have escalated its countermeasures against mainstream and Jewish dissidents. Ordinary criminal charges based on planted or doctored evidence are under investigation in certain cases involving Helsinki monitors (e.g., Ginzburg, who also administered the "Solzhenitsyn fund"), the intention being to demean the defendants' political activities by "criminalizing" their political behavior.<sup>26</sup> Heretofore, human rights dissenters were usually charged with political crimes, which at least acknowledged their status as political activists.

Since the concept of "criminalization" of political acts had already been employed in the past against Jews seeking to emigrate, the regime's latest escalation has been to "over-politicize" some recent cases by attempting to implicate Jewish activists in alleged United States Central Intelligence Agency activities (the Georgian agent-provocateur tried this) or to actually accuse a Jewish defendant of CIA ties (e.g., Shcharansky).

The final difference between the "Nixon" and "Belgrade" KGB campaigns is that the West, and especially the United States government, is no longer merely a passive observer.

Soviet repression has come under increasing criticism since 1976 from diverse sources, including the Euro-Communist parties of Italy, France and Spain; several West European governments; and, since President Jimmy Carter's inauguration, the United States government as well. Previously, the Soviet leadership disregarded or brushed aside criticism from private Western

human rights groups, prominent liberal intellectuals and recent emigrés; but criticism from governments, not to mention fraternal Communist parties, could not be ignored or lightly regarded. Government criticism of the Soviet Union was legitimized by the Helsinki agreement of 1975; and the Euro-Communist parties, for reasons of principle mixed with expediency, have found it necessary to criticize Soviet repression if they hope to be regarded as potential governing parties in their liberal democratic societies.

Western awareness of post-Stalin political justice began with the Siniavsky-Daniel trial of 1966 and (to a lesser degree) the Brodsky case of 1964; but the present volume and diversity of Western comment exceed any past criticism. The Brezhnev regime has alternated between selective responsiveness and general rejection of foreign criticism. After the French Communist party took up the cause of Plyushch, the Marxist mathematician committed to a mental institution for his dissident behavior, he was released in January, 1976, and permitted to emigrate to France. The Italian Communists, who have been more independent and critical of Moscow, have been vocal on a number of human rights issues in the Soviet Union and East Europe and recently invited Roy Medvedev, the neo-Leninist critic of the regime, to contribute to a party journal. The Spanish Communist leader, Santiago Carillo, has been the most strident in his criticism, and Moscow responded sharply during the summer of 1977 with a polemical counterattack.

However, of all the foreign critics, it is Jimmy Carter who seems to have most irritated the Soviet leadership. Candidate Carter's remarks and his telegram of support to the Jewish activist Vladimir Slepak were dismissed as presidential campaign rhetoric. Even Secretary of State-designate Cyrus Vance's meeting with the emigré dissident Andrei Amalrik was not taken as cause for alarm, but was regarded as a political move by an incoming administration sensitive to President Gerald Ford's gaffe in refusing to meet with the exiled Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1975. Carter's inaugural address was also taken in stride, with the Soviet press emphasizing his pro-détente statements, while dissident commentary stressed his human rights remarks. Then, in rapid succession, beginning in early February, 1977, came the shock of President Carter's letter to academician Sakharov,<sup>27</sup> official United States expressions of concern over the arrests of Ginzburg and Orlov, the reception of Bukovsky at the White House in March, Secretary of State Vance's Law Day speech in April outlining a formal policy on human rights, and President Carter's Notre Dame speech in May reaffirming his commitment to the human rights policy within the context of United States foreign policy.<sup>28</sup>

In spite of repeated assurances from President Carter, Vance, and other administration spokesmen that the U.S.S.R. was not being singled out for criticism, the Soviet leadership took offense at what it regarded as

<sup>25</sup>See L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy: XXVth Congress of the CPSU* (Moscow: Novosti, 1976), pp. 101-102.

<sup>26</sup>See reports in *The New York Times*, December 30, 1976, p. 6; and January 6, 1977, p. 3. See also *Second Semiannual Report by the President to the United States oversight commission on the Helsinki Accords* (1977), p. 4.

<sup>27</sup>For the texts of the Sakharov-Carter letters, see Chalidze, *Chronicle*, no. 25 (January-March, 1977), pp. 5-7.

<sup>28</sup>See, in the order mentioned, *Second Semiannual Report by the President to the United States Helsinki commission* (1977), pp. 4-5; the summary of Vance's April 30 speech in *The New York Times*, May 1, 1977, p. 1; and the "Text of President's Commencement Address at Notre Dame on Foreign Policy," *The New York Times*, May 23, 1977, p. 12.

a series of affronts and gross violations of the spirit of détente. Citing another principle of the Helsinki Accords, noninterference, the Soviet Union began publicly to rebuke the United States for interfering in internal Soviet affairs.

Meanwhile, the KGB's latest campaign against the dissidents rolled on, and the United States and the Soviet Union headed for a possible collision at the preliminary Belgrade meeting in June, 1977, to set the agenda for the mandated Helsinki Review Conference scheduled for the fall in Belgrade. On the human rights issue, the United States and Soviet positions remain fundamentally irreconcilable. In the Western tradition of free speech, press, and assembly as well as the right to live in the country of one's choice, the United States delegation went to Belgrade with a detailed critique of Soviet human rights violations since December, 1976.

The Soviet delegation, in turn, arrived at the conference with its own thick briefing book documenting American unemployment and discrimination, both of which are considered deprivations of human rights from the "materialist" Soviet perspective, with the Soviet emphasis on a citizen's right to a job, housing, education, and health care. The Soviet diplomats were also prepared to rebut United States criticism by citing the "Catch-22" phrase of the Soviet constitution, which permits the exercise of what the West regards as basic freedoms "only in conformity with the interests of the working people and for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system." This restrictive language remained unchanged in the draft version of the new Soviet constitution released in June before the Belgrade meeting.<sup>29</sup>

The hostile Soviet reaction to what Soviet leaders perceive as the Carter administration's human rights crusade against the Soviet Union was most apparent in

June and July, 1977. In early June, Shcharansky was formally charged with espionage for his alleged dealings with the CIA. The treason law (Article 64), which carries the maximum penalty of death, has rarely been used against dissidents.<sup>30</sup> A week and a half later, a few days before the Belgrade conference convened in mid-June, American reporter Robert Toth of the *Los Angeles Times* was detained, prevented from leaving for reassignment, and interrogated for several days by the KGB, before he was allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Then came the July 4 incident when United States Ambassador Malcolm Toon was prevented at the last minute from reading a prearranged Independence Day statement over Soviet television because of his refusal to delete an offending sentence on human rights. This incident was followed a few days later by a meeting at the Kremlin at which Brezhnev lectured Toon on the Carter administration's "unconstructive" approach to Soviet-American détente.<sup>31</sup>

Throughout this period, President Carter responded with restraint. He denied any connection between the CIA and Shcharansky, made Toth's safe return a public concern, and on July 12 replied to Brezhnev's blunt remarks, reiterating his own unswerving commitment to détente along with his intention to press on with the human rights issue: "I have no apologies to offer and I have no regrets about the issues that have proved to be controversial."<sup>32</sup>

While there has been some debate in the West over the effect of Carter's human rights policy on détente, there has been little discord among the dissidents themselves on the relationship of the American human rights policy to the dialectic of repression and dissent in the Soviet Union. In March, 1977, a few days before his arrest, Shcharansky expressed what seems to be the consensus: "'Whatever happens to us,' he said, Soviet dissidents will continue to hold the same position 'that Western pressure is the only possible way of saving the movement and having real détente.'"<sup>33</sup>

## FUTURE OF SOVIET DISSIDENCE

The latest Soviet campaign against dissidents has in no way been a response to President Carter's activism on human rights. Both Andrei Amalrik<sup>34</sup> and Roy  
(Continued on page 130)

<sup>29</sup>Compare Article 125 of the Soviet constitution of 1936 and Article 50 of the draft version of the new constitution of 1977. The draft was published in *Pravda* and all major Soviet newspapers on June 4, 1977. For an English translation, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 29, no. 22 (June 29, 1977), pp. 1-11 and 22.

<sup>30</sup>For Art. 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, see Berman, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>31</sup>See Christopher S. Wren, "Brezhnev Lectures U.S. Envoy on Policy," *The New York Times*, July 6, 1977, p. 1; and Hedrick Smith's analysis of the Toon incident on July 4, "For Moscow, the Times Are A-Changin'," *The New York Times*, July 10, 1977, sec. 4, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup>Quoted from the "Transcript of Carter's News Conference on Domestic and Foreign Affairs," *The New York Times*, July 13, 1977, p. A12. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Carter Denies CIA Engaged Soviet Jew," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1977, p. 1. In addition, see "Excerpts from the Address by President Carter on U.S.-Soviet Relations," *The New York Times*, July 22, 1977, p. A4.

<sup>33</sup>Quoted from David K. Shipler, "Soviet Links Dissidents to C.I.A.; Arrests Expected," *The New York Times*, March 5, 1977, p. 3.

<sup>34</sup>Andrei Amalrik, "Dissidents' Fate Turns on Kremlin Struggle," *Washington Post*, June 5, 1977, Outlook sec., p. C3.

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*"Two factors may reduce the dependence of the Soviet Union on the United States for grain during the next five to ten years. One is the result of the grain agreement, and the other is the striking change in the world grain situation that has occurred since 1974."*

# Soviet Agriculture and United States-Soviet Relations

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**I**N recent years there has been considerable interest in the extent to which the erratic performance of Soviet agriculture creates vulnerabilities and influences Soviet foreign policy. The large grain imports in 1972-1973 and 1975-1976 have been interpreted to mean that the Soviet economy is significantly dependent upon the major grain exporters, and particularly upon the United States, for a significant part of the Soviet food supply in years of poor grain crops.

Thus it is important to gain perspective on the relationships between the performance of Soviet agriculture and Soviet agricultural policy and Soviet foreign relations, with specific reference to United States-Soviet relations.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet agricultural system is one of great complexity, though no more so than that of the United States, the United Kingdom or Canada. Any description of an agricultural system must be highly simplified. The emphasis here will be placed on the major features that differentiate Soviet agricultural organization from the agricultures with which readers are more familiar, although only the most important differentiating factors can be noted.

Almost all the agricultural land in the Soviet Union is socialized and operated by either collective or state farms. The average size of the farms is large—6,500 hectares (16,100 acres) for collective farms and 19,100 hectares (47,200 acres) for state farms. These two types of farms have a total cultivated area of approximately 225 million hectares, which is some 40 percent larger than the cultivated area in the United States. Due to the large size of the farms, the total number of farms is small, there being (as of the beginning of 1976) 28,000

collective farms and 18,100 state farms. The total sown area in the socialized sector is divided approximately equally between the collective and state farms.

In theory, a collective farm is a producer cooperative, managed by a chairman and board of directors elected by the members. The collective farm is assigned land in perpetuity, though the farm can neither sell nor rent the land. There is no evidence that the process of amalgamating collective farms, which resulted in the reduction of more than 200,000 farms (with half the reduction occurring in one year), was achieved by the free votes of the members of the collective farms.

In fact, the collective farms have only limited decision-making roles. Each farm is required to deliver a substantial amount of its output to the state procurement agencies. If sales are in excess of the amounts specified, the farms receive substantially higher prices for many commodities. Farms may also sell part of their output in the collective farm markets, where prices more nearly reflect supply and demand conditions, but such sales are possible only after the planned deliveries are made to the procurement agencies.

Members of the collective farms receive payment on the basis of the number of days worked and factors that reflect the skill required for the work performed. Until approximately a decade ago, the members were residual claimants to the income of the collective farms. However, in recent years a system of minimum daily payments has been instituted, and the collective farms are required to make such payments on a timely basis. On a farm of relatively low productivity, minimum payments, with some adjustments for skill factors, may be the only payments received. On a farm with a relatively high productivity, payments can and do exceed minimum payments by a substantial margin.

The state farm can be fairly accurately described as a corporate farm. Workers receive wages; the state

<sup>1</sup>Much of the material in the first two sections of this article is based on D. Gale Johnson, *The Soviet Impact on World Grain Trade* (Washington, D.C.: British-North American Committee, 1977).



supplies the capital and takes the profit, if any. If there is a loss, this is covered by a subsidy.

When agriculture was first socialized there were important differences between collective and state farms. However, recent trends indicate that an effort is being made to reduce the differences between the two forms. The institution of a minimum wage for members of collective farms probably had more than one objective, but one effect was to make the collective farm much more like the state farm. It may also be noted that the relative importance of state farms, as measured by sown area, has increased greatly in the last quarter century. In 1950, state farms cultivated only 12 percent of the sown area; today, such farms cultivate approximately half the sown area.

### MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURE

The management of Soviet agriculture is highly centralized. Most important decisions are made in Moscow through the five year plans, annual plans, and specific instructions concerning a wide variety of farm activities. Decisions are implemented by means of directives, which set goals for the size of the livestock herd, list planting and harvesting dates, and establish procurement plans. Prices have some role. For many products relatively large premiums are paid for above-plan deliveries and for the delivery of particular weights and qualities of livestock products.

The operating principle that seems to guide agricultural planners and officials is that the farms cannot be trusted to make appropriate decisions. While there is a great deal of objective evidence to support this conclusion, the basic idea was well put in a speech by A. Romyantsev at the International Conference of Agricultural Economics in Minsk in 1970:

Every collective farm cannot take into account society's real needs in agricultural products. This can be done only by socialist society as a whole. The latter makes the necessary information available to all collective farms in a centralized way, by drawing up its firm plan of purchasing farm products, by placing orders with these farms and thus ensuring the stability of their production.

Members of collective farms and employees on state farms, as well as large numbers of workers in nonfarm areas, have small plots of land for their personal cultivation, ranging in size from less than half an acre to somewhat more than an acre.

These plots account for approximately 3 percent of the total sown area; yet approximately 30 percent of gross agricultural output is produced on the plots. In recent years, approximately one-third of total meat and milk output, two-thirds of the potato crop and two-fifths of the fruit and vegetable crops have been produced in the private sector.

This comparison of the importance of private plots in the sown area and their contribution to gross agricultural output is not intended to indicate differences in

productivity between the private and socialized sectors. Most of the concentrate feed for private livestock is produced in the socialized sector, and private livestock graze on the common pasture lands of the collective farms and much otherwise unused land as, for instance, land along roads and highways.

In terms of output growth, Soviet agriculture has performed well compared to West Europe and North America in the years 1950 through 1970. From 1950 through 1976, agricultural output increased at an annual compound rate of 3.4 percent. Over the same period of time, farm output in the United States increased at an annual rate of 2.0 percent. However, Soviet agricultural output increased by only 7 percent from 1970 through 1976—hardly more than 1 percent annually.

Success in achieving a relatively high output growth rate tells only part of the story. Measured by other criteria, the performance of Soviet agriculture over the past two decades leaves something to be desired. Three particular difficulties or shortcomings will be mentioned.

While output grew at a rapid pace, at least until 1970, in recent years growth in demand has been greater than output growth. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has had to depend increasingly on imported grains and feedstuffs to meet the growing demand. Since population in the Soviet Union has been growing at a relatively slow rate—less than 1.5 percent annually from 1950 through 1970 and 1.0 percent or less for the last several years—it is reasonable to inquire why the Soviet Union has found it necessary to import food and feeding materials. One reason for importing grain and feeding materials is that retail prices of meat and milk in state stores have remained constant since 1962, while money incomes per capita have increased substantially. A political decision has been made not to increase retail prices; thus prices have not equated supply and demand. Retail prices have been held constant, even though prices paid for livestock products have increased by at least 50 percent since 1962. It has been possible to have constant retail prices only by paying enormous subsidies on meat and milk production; the current annual level of these subsidies probably exceeds 16 billion rubles. (The official exchange rate for the ruble is US\$1.33.) Another factor is that meat consumption per capita, even though it has doubled since 1950, remains substantially below the level of consumption in other industrial countries with approximately the same per capita income. Thus there has been and remains a very high income elasticity of demand for meat, and per capita meat demand has been growing at an annual rate of at least 3 percent. Not all this demand has been met in state stores at official prices; a significant amount of meat is sold in collective farm markets at prices substantially higher than the official retail prices.

A second shortcoming is that the costs of producing

livestock products, as well as certain other farm products, are very high. Livestock prices are high, and there is frequent discussion in the press that even these prices do not cover the full cost of production, which excludes any return for land and provides only for depreciation on capital. Prices paid to collective farms in 1970 in rubles per 100 kilograms live weight (220 pounds) were cattle, 153; hogs, 161; poultry, 183; milk, 19; eggs, 144. In 1976, prices received by United States farmers in American dollars per 100 kilograms live weight were cattle, \$74; hogs, \$94; milk, \$21; eggs, \$87. Even the 1976 dollar prices in the United States were significantly below the 1970 ruble prices, except for milk.

The third difficulty is the remarkably high percentage of total national investment that has been devoted to agriculture in recent years. In both 1974 and 1975, 27 percent of national investment was devoted to agriculture. While it is true that some of this investment goes for schools, cultural facilities and roads that we would not include in agricultural investment, most of the investment went for buildings, machinery and land improvement. In the 1971 investment plan, less than 17 percent was allotted to "social purposes." Nor is investment in the farm input-producing industries included. In the United States, approximately 7 percent of national investment is in agriculture, and United States agricultural output is larger than in the Soviet Union.

### CLIMATE AND SOILS

Some of the unfavorable aspects of Soviet agriculture—especially the relatively low average yields of grain and the variability of grain yields—are frequently attributed to unfavorable natural conditions. The unfavorable natural feature is the climate. The Soviet Union has no large agricultural area comparable to the American corn belt or the American cotton belt. It can be said with some accuracy that where there is adequate moisture, it is too cool; where it is warm enough, it is too dry.

Soils are not, or should not be, a limiting factor in agricultural production. The Soviet Union has an enormous expanse of high quality chernozem and chestnut soils—in excess of 1.1 million square miles or more than one-third of the continental area of the United States. However, production and yields are dependent upon the complementary relationships between climatic conditions and soils. A large fraction of the high quality soils is associated with relatively limited and variable rainfall. Based on climatic analogs with North America, most of the agricultural area of the Soviet Union is

comparable to the Prairie Provinces of Canada, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Minnesota (or Michigan), Wyoming and New Mexico.

Another shortcoming is the high year-to-year variability in agricultural production, especially in grain production. The production variability imposes substantial costs on the Soviet economy, including the occasional need to import large quantities of grain as in 1972-1973 and 1975-1976. It can also result in food shortages, especially meat shortages.

Based on experience in the comparable North American areas, the high costs of agricultural output in the Soviet Union cannot be attributed to climatic conditions. Grain and livestock production undertaken in the comparable North American areas are not higher in cost, for the same crops or livestock, than products in climatically more favorable areas. The Prairie Provinces, which are comparable to one-third of the grain-growing area of the Soviet Union, are one of the low-cost wheat producing areas of the world. The relatively high costs of agricultural output, especially of livestock products, in the Soviet Union must be attributed to factors other than climate or soils.

To what extent could variability in grain production in the Soviet Union be reduced by modification of farming practices? I believe that a substantial reduction in grain production variability could be achieved, though at some sacrifice in total production. In the Prairie Provinces, approximately 80 percent of the wheat is sown on fallowed land; little more than one-tenth of the Soviet grain is grown on fallowed land.<sup>2</sup>

Wheat sown on summer fallow land yields significantly more than wheat sown on stubble or after another crop. The size of the increase varies with soil and climatic conditions. Based on work done several years ago it can be said, at least for illustrative purposes, that in areas comparable to much of the grain-growing areas of the Soviet Union the yield increase due to summer fallow is 60 to 70 percent. Unless the area devoted to grain could be increased by introducing summer fallow into the rotation, grain output would be reduced somewhat if the percentage of grain sown on summer fallow increased from its current 10 percent to 60 percent. The reason independent farmers adopt summer fallowing, even when total output over a rotation cycle is reduced, is the reduction in costs of cultivation and seed.

A further consideration may be noted. When weather conditions are relatively favorable and grain yields are high, as they were in 1970, 1971 and 1973, large harvesting and storage losses occur. If the area to be harvested were smaller and yields more stable, such losses could be substantially reduced. The significance of these points should not be underestimated; it is highly probable that in high-yield years losses because of excess produce may be of the order of 5 percent of the total output.

Soviet grain yields generally are lower than those

<sup>2</sup>Growing grain on fallowed land, a practice usually called summer fallowing, means that one year out of every two or perhaps three no crop is grown on the land, which is cultivated in a manner that controls weeds and conserves moisture. Thus grain sown on summer fallow has less competition from weeds and a larger reserve of moisture in the soil.

obtained in comparable areas of the United States and Canada. But it should not be inferred from this comparison, given the limited use of fallow, that Soviet yields are low. In fact, during 1970-1974, the officially published winter wheat yields for the Soviet Union were higher than the averages for the entire United States. While the Soviet yields may need to be discounted by 15 to 20 percent, the average official winter wheat yields in the Soviet Union are higher than for the areas of the United States most analogous to the Soviet Union.

During 1970-1974, spring wheat yields in Saskatchewan were 63 percent higher than in Kazakhstan, the main area of Premier Nikita Khrushchev's New Lands Program. A yield difference of this magnitude is about what one would expect given the difference in the use of summer fallow.

The primary difficulty in expanding livestock production may not be low grain yields, but rather the very low yields of other feed crops and of pastures. Hay yields are abysmally low. Hay appears to have suffered from the fact that it has been a low priority crop, while grain has long had a high priority. Startling contrasts pervade the whole Soviet economy, an economy that can produce jet fighters equal to the best in the world, but has great difficulty producing a decent pair of shoes.

#### THE SOVIET UNION AS A GRAIN IMPORTER

During the past half century, the government of the Soviet Union has followed three different policies with respect to its trade in grain. From approximately 1930 until the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, it was considered essential to maintain grain exports as a means for paying for the imports required for industrialization. There was famine in the Soviet Union in 1932 through 1934, yet grain exports were continued. Khrushchev claimed that there was famine in 1947, and yet Stalin continued to export grain. Throughout the remainder of the 1950's and during the 1960's, the Soviet Union did permit exports to vary, to reflect changes in the domestic supply situation. Following the poor grain crops of 1963 and 1965, there were substantial grain imports, although the amounts imported were less than one-third of the production shortfalls. To provide adequate grains for human consumption, substantial reductions were made in the livestock herd in those years.

A new policy emerged in 1970 or 1971, which indicated the willingness of the Soviet Union to import grain, if necessary, to support its program of expanding livestock and milk production.

The Soviet Union had a record grain crop in 1970; in 1971, it had the second largest grain crop in its history. Yet during the 1971-1972 marketing year, the Soviet Union imported three million tons of feed grains from the United States, and became a small net importer of all grains (after being a net exporter of seven million tons in 1970-1971). The substantial grain imports in 1971-1972 were not a response to a poor grain crop but

the result of a change in agricultural policy. This change in policy was to increase the production of livestock products at the same rate as the growth of demand at fixed consumer prices, and to provide grain and feed materials to achieve the desired increase in livestock output, even if to do so required the importation of grain.

The policy change, which was signaled by the grain imports of 1971-1972, was apparently missed by most Western observers until the large 1972-1973 purchases were made. The failure to recognize a policy change meant that virtually all participants and observers of the grain market failed to anticipate the enormous size of the 1972-1973 Soviet grain imports.

Another factor that apparently confused those involved in grain markets was the lack of accurate knowledge about the size of Soviet grain stocks. In the absence of such knowledge, it seemed reasonable to assume that after two very large grain crops reserves would have been built up. The 1970 and 1971 grain crops averaged 184 million tons, compared to 163 million tons on average for the four prior years. Yet subsequent analyses of Soviet data indicate that it was highly probable that grain stocks were *reduced* during these two years, although the reductions were very small, and it might well be true that there was no change in grain reserves after two record crops.

The large grain imports in 1972-1973 were a response to a relatively modest decline in Soviet grain production—13 million tons, or 7 percent. In contrast to the reduced production in the 1960's, when imports equaled a relatively small fraction of the shortfall, the increase in imports in 1972-1973 over 1971-1972 was greater than the reduction in grain production. According to official estimates, production declined by 13 million tons while net imports increased by 18 million tons.

The next change in Soviet policy affecting grain trade may be a storage policy that in effect would reduce the variability of net grain trade. There is evidence of a substantial program of increasing storage capacity, though it is not yet clear whether the aim of the additional capacity is to reduce losses during the marketing year or to provide for storing substantial quantities of grain from years of good crops to years of poor crops.

#### THE SOVIET GRAIN TRADE

The Soviet Union is a most capable importer, making effective use of its monopoly of information concerning its factual situation and intentions. In the past, not all its advantages were derived from secrecy and its use of a single purchasing agency. Until 1973, most of its grain imports were made in a setting in which exporters were anxious to export, frequently engaging in a variety of measures to dispose of stocks regarded as burdensome.

The very large Soviet grain imports in 1972-1973 illustrate the effective use of the Soviet Union's monopoly of information and its rational exploitation of the

desire of the major exporters to expand exports and reduce their grain stocks. United States grain export and pricing policy—the establishment of a fixed export price and an export subsidy equal to the difference between the domestic and export price—was skillfully exploited by the Soviet purchasing agents. If the United States had not had an export subsidy on wheat, the Soviet Union would have been much less successful in buying such enormous quantities of grain with a minimal impact on the prices paid.

The impact on prices paid by the Soviet Union for United States wheat was truly minimal. For the first six months of 1972, the average unit value or price of all wheat shipped from the United States was \$60.20 per metric ton (\$1.64 per bushel). The average unit value of all wheat shipped to the Soviet Union during 1972-1973 was \$59.50 per ton (\$1.62 per bushel). The average export unit value for wheat shipped to Japan in 1972-1973 was \$81.90 per ton (\$2.23 per bushel).

Another factor in the apparent success of the Soviet Union in its grain trade during 1972-1973 was its willingness to contract for the full year's imports early in the season. When prices are increasing, as in 1973-1974 as well as in 1972-1973, forward commitments are advantageous. One can say that the Soviets were either lucky or better price forecasters than the rest of us in 1972 and 1973. However, when prices are declining, forward commitments to purchase can and do turn out to be disadvantageous. Thus, in the first half of 1975, the average export price of wheat at the Gulf ports was \$144 per ton (\$3.93 per bushel) while the average price of the wheat actually shipped to the Soviet Union during the same period was \$207 (\$5.65 per bushel). India, which buys on a more current basis, paid \$152 (\$4.15 per bushel).<sup>3</sup>

## SOVIET AGRICULTURE AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

No one who is not privy to the discussions in the Kremlin knows exactly what effects the negative features of Soviet agriculture have on Soviet foreign policy or on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those who believe that the United States could use its dominance in international trade in grains and soybeans significantly to influence Soviet foreign policy or Soviet domestic policies on issues like human rights are almost certainly mistaken. Yet the high cost of agricultural production and the variability of production must surely have some influence on the behavior of Soviet decision-makers, if only because these features to some degree limit the available alternatives.

The United States-Soviet Grain Supply Arrangement that was signed in October, 1975, and the discus-

sions preceding it indicate that Soviet leaders are sensitive to their actual or potential dependence upon the United States as a source of their food supply. In the agreement, which became effective October 1, 1976, the Soviet Union agreed to purchase a minimum of six million tons of wheat and corn from the United States for each of five years. An additional two million tons may be purchased without interference; any commitments to purchase more than eight million tons can be made only after consultation between the two governments.

The Soviet Union had a bumper grain crop in 1976, and it purchased at least six million tons of wheat and corn from us during the 1976-1977 crop year. Without the agreement, if past behavior had been followed, it is almost certain that the Soviet Union would have imported little or no grain in 1976-1977. A significant amount of the net grain imports was added to stocks. In fact, given the large 1976 grain crop and the difficulties of expanding livestock feeding after the reductions of livestock herds following the poor 1975 crop, Soviet grain stocks would have increased had there been no imports.

The United States insisted on the agreement as a means of minimizing the price effects of wide fluctuations in Soviet grain imports. The agreement permits the United States to treat grain exports to the Soviet Union on a discriminatory basis: exports to the Soviet Union can be limited without imposing limits on other importers. The Soviet Union was willing to accept this discrimination in return for guaranteed access to the American market for up to 40 million tons of corn and wheat over a five-year period.

The interests of the United States in reaching the agreement were primarily domestic. On the one hand, the agreement responded to the fear that Soviet grain purchases in the United States could result in high food prices. On the other hand, grain producers had been exceedingly critical of export controls and wanted a minimum of interference with exports. By guaranteeing that the Soviet Union must import a minimum of 6 million tons of grain annually, farmers were assured of an export outlet for this amount.

(Continued on page 133)

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<sup>3</sup>For all of 1974-1975, the export unit values (per ton) were: U.S.S.R., \$198; India, \$154; Japan, \$186; and all wheat, \$178.



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*"In summary, it appears that over the next 10 to 15 years, Soviet Asian development will be affected most strongly by an intense demand for Siberian resources, especially energy resources. . . . In the longer term, it seems likely that Central Asian labor resources and the transfer southward of Siberian water will be major influences on Soviet Asian development."*

## The Development of Soviet Asia

BY ROBERT N. NORTH

*Assistant Professor of Geography, University of British Columbia*

**B**Y Soviet convention, Europe meets Asia along the eastern edge of the Ural mountains, the River Emba, the Caspian Sea, and the Manych depression (see map). Soviet Asia includes three-fourths of the country's area and one-third of its population (table 1). For comparison, Canada, Mexico, and the Pacific and mountain states of the United States of America make up a similar share of North America.

Like its North American counterpart, Soviet Asia includes regions that differ completely in natural conditions, history and economic roles (table 2). *Northern Siberia* is both a storehouse of mineral and forest riches, and a region of forbidding natural barriers to their exploitation. Its history and present role parallel those of northern Canada and Alaska, except that Siberia adds exile, labor camps and denser settlement to the common historical elements of the fur trade, gold rushes, rare metal mining, and (now) the feverish search for oil and natural gas. In the 1930's, the Soviet press depicted the severe natural conditions as inspiring challenges to socialist man. Since then, the challenges have of necessity been met, and visionary writing has given way to more cautious analysis.

*Southwestern Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan*, climatically comparable to the Canadian prairies and adjacent parts of the United States, also share a history of river steamers, railway building and farming settlement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. All these regions were settled after the settle-

ment of better and more accessible lands in the Ukraine and American midwest, respectively. Since that time both regions have also faced serious problems of aridity on their southern margins, on their way to becoming major wheat producers. Industrially they differ: the Siberian region has acquired far more heavy industry per capita, based mainly on coal mining in the Kuzbas.

*Southeastern Siberia* and the *Southern Far East* recall British Columbia in their resources, settlement and development problems. Forestry, mining, fishing and hydro-electricity support nodes of settlement, but remoteness from the national market has been a major formative influence. Until recently, the Soviet preference for autarchic development, coupled with poor foreign relations in the east, left the Soviet far east primarily to supply scarce raw materials to the domestic market. Tin and tungsten were exploited, therefore, but coal, copper and wood were neglected. The region contrasted sharply with British Columbia, where similar resources were exploited for world markets, often by foreign capital, and became the mainstay of the economy.

In all three of these Soviet regions, as in North America, European immigrants have long been dominant, numerically, culturally and economically. That is not so in the *Caucasus* and *Soviet Central Asia*. The Slavic element dominates north of the Caucasus mountains, where nineteenth-century farming settlement was an extension of farming in the Ukraine,<sup>1</sup> and this element also dominates in individual cities elsewhere;<sup>2</sup> but in the Caucasus and Central Asia together Slavs comprise less than one-third of the population.<sup>3</sup> It is these regions that are portrayed in the West as the "last great colonial empire," after the fashion of British India. Central Asia fits the pattern in several respects. It has the least manufacturing per capita in the Soviet Union, at the same time supplying cotton, natural gas and metals to the European U.S.S.R.; it has traditionally been poorly represented at the highest levels<sup>4</sup> of

<sup>1</sup>Russians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians comprise over 90 percent of the population of Stavropol'kray (territory) and Krasnodar kray.

<sup>2</sup>Over 70 percent in two Central Asian republican capitals, Alma-Ata and Frunze.

<sup>3</sup>Including 8 percent in Transcaucasia and 25 percent in Central Asia.

<sup>4</sup>A. Nove and J. A. Newth, *The Soviet Middle East: A Model for Development?* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), p. 116.

TABLE 1: Soviet Asia in the Soviet Union, 1955-1975

	1955		1975	
	Soviet total	Percent in Asia <sup>a</sup>	Soviet total	Percent in Asia <sup>a</sup>
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	200	29.6	256	34.6
Investment (billion rubles) <sup>c</sup>	91	32.0	502	35.8
Rail traffic (million tons dispatched)	834	25.3	3049	33.2
Production: <sup>d</sup>				
Coal (million tons)	391	35.5	701	48.8
Oil (million tons)	71	40.1	491	48.7
Natural gas (bill. cu. meters)	9	28.3	289	55.0
Electricity (bill. kwt-hrs.)	170	23.6	1039	31.2
Iron ore (million tons)	72	6.4	233	16.2
Crude steel (million tons)	45	13.0	141	15.3
Lumber (mill. cu. meters)	76	28.8	116	34.8
Paper (thousand tons)	1863	9.2	5215	8.7
Cotton cloth (million meters)	5905	10.5	7810	14.5
Leather footwear (mill. pairs)	274	20.9	698	23.9
Grain (million tons) <sup>e</sup>	81	29.9	182	34.2
Wheat (million tons) <sup>e</sup>	34	41.4	89	46.6
Sugar beet (million tons) <sup>e</sup>	21	8.8	76	14.2
Flax (thousand tons) <sup>e</sup>	227	6.1	456	1.4
Potatoes (million tons) <sup>e</sup>	76	11.9	90	14.6

a. Several percentages are estimated, since boundaries of data areas do not fit those of Soviet Asia.

b. 1956.

c. Fifth 5-Year Plan (1951-55) and Ninth Plan (1971-75).

d. In addition, Soviet Asia produces virtually all the country's cotton, tea, citrus fruits, diamonds, tungsten, tin, antimony, and uranium, and most of its lead, zinc, copper, gold, and mercury.

e. Averages for 1949-53 and 1971-75.

Sources: Soviet statistical handbooks and T. Shabad, *Basic Industrial Resources of the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), *passim*.

government and party; and the Slavic element tends to be especially well represented in administration, engineering, and similar responsible work. Even Russian Tashkent recalls New Delhi, built for colonial administrators alongside the native city. Yet a careful Western study suggests a more complex balance of costs and benefits to Central Asia,<sup>5</sup> which the Soviet government after all is proud to present as a showpiece of development for the third world.

In any case, the Caucasus is cast in a different mold. It has been strongly represented in party and government; in the accessibility and history of exploitation of its resources it is more an extension of the European U.S.S.R. than a part of Soviet Asia; and its manufac-

turing per capita, though low, is well above that of Central Asia.<sup>6</sup>

Soviet Asia has been increasing its shares of Soviet population and industry slowly and of Soviet energy production very rapidly. The potential for further expansion depends on its resources. In the case of agriculture, current shares of production probably reflect relative regional potentials well, since national demand has been pressing hard on resources for many years. Soviet Asia still has land which could be drained or irrigated, but the potential for improving yields is probably better in the European U.S.S.R., especially on lands misused in the past.<sup>7</sup> These generalizations are subject to one major caveat. Siberia has most of the nation's unused fresh water.<sup>8</sup> If it could be made available for irrigation, Soviet Asia's agricultural potential would grow enormously.

#### MINERAL WEALTH


The Soviet Union is better supplied than any other nation with the minerals needed by modern industry. Considering its geological variety and the much heavier exploitation of European resources hitherto, Soviet Asia probably contains a larger share of the nation's mineral wealth than of its territory. (Its shares of hydro and forest resources are also impressive, though figures for the latter are deceptive. Tree growth is so slow in northeastern Siberia and the ecological damage caused

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.* For a brief recent review of some of the issues, see M. Mobin Shorish, "Soviet Developmental Strategies in Central Asia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 17, no. 2 and 3 (Summer and Fall, 1975), pp. 404-416.

<sup>6</sup>Leslie Dienes, "Investment Priorities in Soviet Regions," *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, vol. 62, no. 3 (September, 1972), p. 438.

<sup>7</sup>For a review of possible improvements in one region of the European U.S.S.R., see N. Borchenko, "The Problem of Integrated Development of Agriculture in the Nonchernozem Zone," *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, vol. 16, no. 4 (April, 1975), pp. 249-256. Translated from *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, 1974, no. 4, pp. 83-90.

<sup>8</sup>K. V. Dolgopopolov and Ye. F. Fedorova, *Voda—natsional'noye dostoyaniye* (Moscow: Mysl', 1973), chapter 1.



by logging so serious, that large areas were long ago declared unusable.)<sup>9</sup>

The expansion of Soviet Asia's economic role is not seriously constrained by lack of minerals. Biological resources are more limited but not yet fully utilized. Soviet Asia is a region of great internal variety, but its resources have been exploited under common national influences for some hundred years. In Tsarist times, attractive natural resources, together with the expansion and securing of the national territory, were the main stimuli to regional investment. The resources were needed in European Russia (which contained four-fifths of the population and almost all the industry) for export, mainly to West Europe. The region was also important for its ability to absorb surplus population from European Russia. In the Soviet era, the balance of demand has swung towards home markets—the world's second-ranking industrial nation ranked only eleventh in world trade in 1974, next to Canada—and home demand is still concentrated, though now less overwhelmingly, in the European U.S.S.R. Exports move more to East than to West Europe, but the two together still accounted for three-fourths of the Soviet total in 1975. In other words, the bulk of demand for Soviet natural resources originates, as it always has, in the European U.S.S.R. or across the western frontier.

When comparable resources have been available in different locations, the first call has naturally been on the European U.S.S.R. For commodities not found there in sufficient quantity or not found at all, demand has reached out to Soviet Asia. (With some exceptions, it has reached beyond the national borders only as a last resort.)<sup>10</sup> In effect, waves of resource exploitation have spread out unevenly from the European U.S.S.R. Channeled by transport routes, exploitation has reached parts of western Siberia, along the Siberian railway, or of Transcaucasia, near the Caspian or Black Sea coasts, sooner than exploitation reached much of the north European U.S.S.R. Exploitation has been affected by the sequence of resource discoveries and technological change. Mineral exploitation, in par-

ticular, has spread outward in successive waves, returning to deposits closer to the European U.S.S.R. as advances in mining technology have renewed their attractiveness. Finally, and especially in the Soviet era, exploitation has been affected by regional development policies. Some outlying regions have been given priority in mineral prospecting and exploitation, as well as in industrialization. Building up regional industries and population has created Asian centers of demand and has reduced the dominance of the waves originating in the European U.S.S.R.

The model described above is highly simplified, but it helps to explain Soviet Asian resource exploitation. Commodities for which demand exceeds supply in the European U.S.S.R. include oil, natural gas, coal and wood. A growing share of these necessities is being drawn from Soviet Asia and from less accessible regions within Soviet Asia. Iron fell into this category until technical advances permitted the development of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly. A similar trend reversal may follow for wood when full forest utilization and, ultimately, reforestation in the European U.S.S.R. become cheaper than further penetration into Siberia.<sup>11</sup> No such reversal is likely for natural gas, but recent discoveries west of the Urals, at Vuktyl and Orenburg, have been given immediate priority in development.

All the commodities mentioned above are sensitive to transport costs. Much less so are rare, high value-to-weight ratio items unobtainable in the European U.S.S.R., like diamonds and tin. They are exploited for the European market in parts of northeastern Siberia where rich coal deposits, for example, still lie untouched.

Agriculture illustrates the operation of the model equally well. Analogous to diamonds and tin are tea and citrus fruits in Transcaucasia, cotton there and in Central Asia, and soybeans in the Far East. None of these crops will grow elsewhere; all are in high demand; and the result is regional specialization. In a more open economy, some of these products might well be eliminated by cheaper imports. Analogous to oil and natural gas are cereals, which the European U.S.S.R. used to export. Growing demand brought expansion onto poorer and poorer lands in Soviet Asia; the expansion culminated in Premier Nikita Khrushchev's Virgin Lands scheme in the 1950's. Since then, the pendulum has swung back towards intensification, and the poorly managed non-chernozem farmlands of the central European U.S.S.R. are receiving renewed attention.<sup>12</sup>

There is a growing demand for many Soviet Asian resources, but the region's future will probably be colored by heavy demand for three in particular, and by the policies chosen to exploit them: energy sources, agricultural resources, and labor resources. (Some Soviet authorities also emphasize, for example, Siberian water as an attraction to industry, since the European U.S.S.R. is running short.)<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup>B. M. Perepechin and N. P. Filinov, *Lesoispol'zovanie v SSSR, 1946-1962 gg.* (Moscow: Lesnaya promyshlennost', 1964), map after p. 48.

<sup>10</sup>The main exceptions are imports from the less-developed socialist countries, like Mongolia, North Korea, Cuba and, formerly, China.

<sup>11</sup>This topic is examined in R. N. North and J. J. Solecki, "The Soviet Forest-Products Industry: Its Present and Potential Exports," forthcoming in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 19, no. 3 (Fall, 1977).

<sup>12</sup>"On Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture in the Non-Black-Earth Zone of the Russian Republic," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 26, no. 14 (1 May, 1974), pp. 5-7. Translated from *Pravda*, April 3, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup>For authoritative Soviet views on the attractions of Siberia for investment, see "Regional Planning in the Soviet Economy," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 27, no. 16 (May 19, 1976), pp. 1-4. Condensed from *Pravda*, April 20, p. 2, and *Literaturnaya gazeta*, no. 7 (February 18), p. 11.



**TABLE 2: Regions of Soviet Asia**  
(percent of national totals)<sup>a</sup>

	Caucasus	Soviet Central Asia	SW Siberia, Northern Kazakhstan	South- eastern Siberia	Southern Far East	Northern Siberia	Total Soviet Asia
Area	2.0	9.8	9.8	7.1	4.6	41.5	74.8
Population 1956	7.8	7.7	8.1	3.0	1.9	1.1	29.6
1975	9.6	11.4	7.9	2.6	2.0	1.1	34.6
Investment, 5th 5-Year Plan, 1951-1955	9.0	4.0	9.0 <sup>b</sup>	5.0 <sup>b</sup>	5.0 <sup>b</sup>	b	32.0
9th 5-Year Plan, 1971-1975	7.3	8.8	10.7 <sup>b</sup>	4.5 <sup>b</sup>	4.5 <sup>b</sup>	b	35.8
Rail traffic (tons dispatched) 1950	5.0	3.5	10.6	3.4	2.8	—	25.3
1971	5.4	4.5	12.9	4.6	2.5	—	29.9
Production:							
Coal, 1955	0.8	1.5	22.0	6.9 <sup>c</sup>	4.3 <sup>c</sup>	—	35.5
1975	0.3	1.5	32.9	8.4 <sup>c</sup>	5.7 <sup>c</sup>	—	48.8
1980 Plan	0.3	1.6	35.5	9.8 <sup>c</sup>	5.7 <sup>c</sup>	—	52.9
Oil, 1955	30.8 <sup>c</sup>	5.9	2.0	—	1.4	—	40.1
1975	9.7	3.6	4.9	—	d	30.5 <sup>d</sup>	48.7
1980 Plan	8.1 <sup>c</sup>	2.3 <sup>c</sup>	4.2	—	d	46.9 <sup>d</sup>	61.5
Natural gas, 1955	23.2	3.0	—	—	2.1	—	28.3
1975	8.6	32.6	—	—	d	13.8 <sup>d</sup>	55.0
1980 Plan	5.0	27.0	—	—	d	35.6 <sup>d</sup>	67.6
Iron ore, 1955	1.1	—	5.3	—	—	—	6.4
1975	0.6	—	12.4	3.2	—	—	16.2
1980 Plan	0.5	—	12.2	2.7	—	—	15.4
Crude steel, 1955	2.1	0.5	9.0	0.8	0.6	—	13.0
1975	1.6	0.3	13.4 <sup>c</sup>	e	e	—	15.3
1980 Plan	1.5	0.7	13.5 <sup>c</sup>	e	e	—	15.7
Lumber, 1955	3.9	1.5	9.2 <sup>b</sup>	9.6 <sup>b</sup>	4.6 <sup>b</sup>	b	28.8
1975	2.9	1.6	9.7 <sup>b</sup>	14.9 <sup>b</sup>	5.7 <sup>b</sup>	b	34.8
Grain 1949-53 av.	9.9	2.8	12.5	3.2	0.7	0.8	29.9
1971-75 av.	7.7	3.5	18.5	3.2	0.6	0.7	34.2
Wheat 1949-53 av.	14.0	3.8	17.9	3.7	0.7	1.3	41.4
1971-75 av.	9.8	4.2	26.9	4.2	0.5	1.0	46.6

a. Several percentages are estimated, since boundaries of data areas do not fit those of the subregions of Soviet Asia.

b. Northern Siberia is included with the preceding three regions.

c. Guessed.

d. Southern Far East is included with Northern Siberia.

e. The figure for SW Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan includes Southeastern Siberia and the Southern Far East.

Sources: Soviet statistical handbooks.

Soviet dependence on Asian energy resources has been growing rapidly. Oil and natural gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia are still important, but production in most areas has peaked.<sup>14</sup> Incremental needs are being met from natural gas deposits in north-western Siberia, oil deposits along the middle Ob', the coalfields of Karaganda, Ekibastuz, and Kuzbas and Kansk-Achinsk, and hydroelectric stations along the Angara and Yenisey rivers and in Central Asia (see map.) The westward energy flow across the Urals has been estimated at between 350 million and 360 million tons of standard fuel a year<sup>15</sup>—all from west of the Yenisey, since Kansk-Achinsk coal will not travel and East Siberian electricity cannot yet reach the Urals. Most of the country's new oil production capacity by

1980 will be added in western Siberia, and an increase of over 70 percent will be needed to offset declines elsewhere.<sup>16</sup> Ever greater dependence on Asian resources seems inevitable, despite an ambitious program to build nuclear power stations in the European U.S.S.R.

The type of regional development that should accompany resource exploitation has been much debated in the Soviet Union. The traditional Soviet philosophy—not necessarily followed in practice—holds that major natural resources in little-developed regions should be used to build up population and industry nearby. Economic development is thus spread more widely over the

(Continued on page 136)

**Robert N. North** spent a year as a British Council Exchange Scholar at Moscow University in 1963-1964 and has revisited the Soviet Union several times, most recently in the summer of 1976, when he visited western and eastern Siberia. He is completing a book on Siberian development.

<sup>14</sup>Offshore, vol. 37, no. 3 (March, 1977), p. 178.

<sup>15</sup>Leslie Dienes, "Soviet Energy Resources and Prospects," *Current History*, vol. 171, no. 420 (October, 1976), p. 115.

<sup>16</sup>*Oil and Gas Journal*, vol. 75, no. 3 (January 17, 1977), p. 17.

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# BOOK REVIEWS

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## On the Soviet Union

**RED STAR ON THE NILE.** *By Alvin Z. Rubinstein.* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. 383 pages, appendices, selected bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

In this interesting and scholarly study, Alvin Rubinstein explores the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt after Egypt's defeat by Israel in the June, 1967, War. "Defeat transformed the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. The massive flow of Soviet aid after the June War restored Egypt's military capability and intensified interaction between the two countries on all levels. . . ." Rubinstein believes that this relationship was a "pioneering venture in military-political involvement with a non-Communist Third World country." O.E.S.

**PSYCHIATRIC TERROR: HOW SOVIET PSYCHIATRY IS USED TO SUPPRESS DISSENT.** *By Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway.* (New York: Basic Books, Publishers, 1977. 510 pages, appendices, references and index, \$12.95.)

A carefully documented book that will be a source for those interested "in the problem of psychiatric abuse" in the Soviet Union. O.E.S.

**A HISTORY OF RUSSIA.** *By Basil Dmytryshyn.* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. 645 pages and index, \$13.95.)

This is a well-organized history of Russia from early times to the present day. O.E.S.

**STALINISM: ESSAYS IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION.** *Edited by Robert C. Tucker.* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977. 332 pages and index, \$19.95.)

Thirteen specialists on the Soviet Union have contributed original interpretative essays on various aspects of Stalinism. Serious students of Soviet and Communist studies will find this rewarding reading.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein  
University of Pennsylvania

**THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL OIL POLITICS.** *By Arthur Jay Klinghoffen.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 389 pages and index, \$16.50.)

This timely discussion of Soviet oil policy brings together a great deal of material on the economic,

political, and strategic considerations that have motivated changing Soviet behavior in this area.

A.Z.R.

**THE TROUBLED DÉTENTE.** *By Albert L. Weeks.* (New York: New York University Press, 1977. 190 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

This tightly argued study links changing Soviet ideological discussions of détente with actual Soviet foreign policies and concludes that the Soviet challenge to the West is apt to increase, not decrease.

A.Z.R.

**DÉTENTE AND THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE USSR.** *By Frederick C. Barghoorn.* (New York: The Free Press, 1976. 229 pages and index, \$12.95.)

Professor Barghoorn's thesis in this timely and thoughtful book is that "the current 'détente' between the United States and the Soviet Union will remain seriously flawed and limited as long as the Soviet rulers maintain an oppressive internal regime." The core of the book deals with the dissenters and with the emergence of dissidence as conscious political protest in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years.

A.Z.R.

**SOVIET PROPAGANDA, A CASE STUDY OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.** *By Baruch A. Hazan.* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976. 293 pages and index, \$12.95.)

A case study of the organization and performance of the Soviet "information" apparatus as a whole and an analysis of its tactics in the context of Middle Eastern politics in particular. Best are the chapters dealing with the anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli aspects of the operation.

G. Ginsburgs  
University of Pennsylvania

**IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE.** *By Adam B. Ulam.* (New York: Viking Press, 1977. 418 pages and index, \$12.50.)

A masterly account of the generation of dreamers, conspirators, assassins, professional agitators and rebellious thinkers who labored to undermine and overthrow the old regime in Russia before the 1917 revolution. The author weaves a tapestry of the leading personalities, their ideas and activities, the social milieu in which they functioned and their impact on the social and political fabric of the Russian empire in its declining years.

G.G.

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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On June 4, 1977, a 173-article Soviet draft constitution was published in Moscow. Introducing the draft to the May 24 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev declared that the new draft "preserves many of the basic provisions of the constitution now in force, with improved regulations on health services, public education, pensions and environmental protection." He urged wide and free discussion of the draft constitution by the Soviet people. Excerpts follow:

### Draft of the New Soviet Constitution: Excerpts

Article 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of the whole people, expressing the will and the interests of the working class, peasants and intelligentsia of all nations and nationalities in the country.

Article 2. All power in the U.S.S.R. is vested in the people. The people exercise state power through the soviets of people's deputies, which constitute the political foundation of the U.S.S.R. All other state organs shall be under the control of and accountable to the soviets.

Article 3. The Soviet state shall be organized and shall function in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism: election of all organs of state power from the bottom up, accountability to the people, and mandatory fulfillment of the decisions of higher organs by lower organs.

Article 4. The Soviet state and its organs shall function on the basis of socialist legality and assure the protection of law and order, the interests of society and the rights of citizens.

Article 5. The most important matters of state shall be submitted to discussion by the whole people and be put to a vote (referendum) by the whole people.

Article 6. The Communist party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system. The party defines the long-term development of society and outlines domestic and foreign policy.

Article 9. Socialist ownership of the means of production shall be the foundation of the economic system of the U.S.S.R. Socialist ownership shall comprise: state property, the property of collective farms and other cooperatives, and the property of trade unions and other public organizations.

Article 12. Citizens may personally own their earned incomes and savings, a house, the product of limited truck gardening and livestock and poultry raising, and articles of everyday use, personal consumption and convenience.

Article 13. The state shall control the measure of labor and consumption in accordance with the principle "From each according to his ability to each according to his work." Socially useful work and its results shall determine the citizen's status in society.

Article 15. The economy of the U.S.S.R. shall be managed on the basis of state plans for economic, social and cultural development combining centralized leadership with the economic independence and initiative of enterprises, economic associations and other organizations.

Article 17. Individual enterprise in handicrafts, agriculture and services as well as other forms of occupation based entirely on the individual labor of citizens and their families shall be permitted.

Article 34. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. shall be equal before the law, irrespective of origin, social and property status, nationality or race, sex, education, language, attitude to religion, type or character of occupation, domicile or other particulars. Equality shall be insured in all fields of economic, political, social and cultural life.

Article 36. Any and all direct or indirect restriction of rights or the establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on grounds of race or nationality, as well as the advocacy of any racial or ethnic exclusiveness, shall be punishable by law.

Article 50. In conformity with the interests of the working people and for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system, citizens shall be guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations, abilities, training, education, and with due account for the need of society.

Article 52. Freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess any religion and perform religious rites or not to profess any religion, and to conduct atheistic propaganda, shall be recognized for all citizens. Incitement of hostility and hatred on religious grounds shall be prohibited.

Article 56. The privacy of citizens, of correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic messages shall be protected by law.

Article 59. The exercise of rights and freedoms shall be inseparable from the performance by citizens of their duties. Citizens shall be obliged to observe the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and Soviet laws, to respect the rules of socialist behavior and to carry with dignity the high calling of citizen of the U.S.S.R.

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Article 69. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an integral federal multinational state formed on the basis of free self-determination of nations and the voluntary union of equal soviet socialist republics.

Article 71. Every union republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R.

Article 106. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. shall be the highest organ of state power.

Article 118. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. shall be elected from among the Deputies and shall consist of a chairman, the first deputy chairman and 15 deputy chairmen, i.e., one from each union republic; a secretary and 21 members.

Article 127. The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. shall be the highest executive and administrative organ.

Article 131. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers, consisting of the chairman, the first deputy chairmen and the deputy chairmen, shall function as a permanent organ for the purpose of dealing with matters related to the administration of the economy and to other questions of state administration.

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## DISSENT AND REPRESSION IN THE SOVIET UNION

(Continued from page 117)

Medvedev have separately stated that the current campaign was planned well before Carter entered the White House. Medvedev declared through *samizdat* that the Politburo decided last fall to launch the new campaign for the purpose of cutting the dissidents off from the West. Several factors apparently influenced the regime's decision, including its concern over rising dissidence in East Europe, which might have a feedback effect on the internal Soviet situation, the forthcoming Belgrade conferences, and heightened ideological sensitivity as Soviet leaders looked ahead to the gala celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, which culminates on November 7, 1977.<sup>35</sup>

Given these concerns in 1976, two unexpected developments beginning in January, 1977, served to intensify the Brezhnev regime's commitment to the planned new anti-dissident campaign: first, the sudden emergence of the "Charter 77" dissent movement in Czechoslovakia; and second, President Carter's abrupt declaration of his human rights policy, with its catalytic effect on the West's attitude toward Soviet repression of its dissidents.

### THE "FEEDBACK LOOP"

Unlike previous KGB campaigns, which primarily sought to isolate or punish key activists, the thrust of the latest campaign has been to disrupt the communication channel that runs from the dissidents through the Western press corps in Moscow to American and European media and back into the Soviet Union via British and American Russian-language broadcasts. Presumably, if the "channel" could be disrupted, the KGB would be able to devote more attention to the potentially more dangerous ethnic and religious dissent, free of Western criticism and the "feedback loop." To accomplish its basic objective, the KGB neutralized the Helsinki "monitors" as the primary sources of information most damaging to the regime's reputation abroad and removed Shcharansky as the vital connection between the mainstream dissidents and the Jewish emigration movement.

<sup>35</sup>Roy Medvedev's views are summarized by Peter Osnos reporting from Moscow in "Drive on Dissidents Creates 'Ominous Atmosphere,'" *Washington Post*, June 5, 1977, p. 1 and A18.

<sup>36</sup>A scenario hypothesized by Amalrik which "would be disastrous for the [dissident] movement." Quoted from Abraham Brumberg, "Interview: A Conversation with Andrei Amalrik," *Encounter* (June, 1977), p. 34.

<sup>37</sup>Djilas made this statement in an article written for an Italian Socialist newspaper. See "Djilas Says Eastern Bloc Cannot Crush Dissenters," *The New York Times*, April 14, 1977, p. a 11.

Finally, the KGB and the Soviet press have been conducting a more diffuse subcampaign of smear, harassment, and attrition against Western correspondents, particularly those who, through their contacts with the dissidents, have served as the principal conduits in the "anti-Soviet" communication channel.

Has the KGB been effective in these efforts? In the short term, the answer is "no." The harsh campaign itself has already been played back into the Soviet Union through the worldwide communications channel. In addition, President Jimmy Carter's tenaciousness on human rights has kept Soviet repression on the "front page" in the West, overshadowing Brezhnev's new constitution.

The longer term efficacy of the KGB campaign remains to be seen. The arrests have decimated the front ranks of the mainstream dissidents, lowered morale among human rights activists in the movement, and made Western correspondents somewhat more cautious in their role as conduits. The "channel" may be disrupted for a time, giving the aging Soviet leadership at least temporary respite. However, this depends on the length of the recovery process, by means of which new personnel move up to "front line" positions in the dissident movement. That this process will occur seems probable. As Roy Medvedev has pointed out, the 1976-1977 repression was not so severe as the first major campaign of 1967-68. The "movement" recovered from that earlier onslaught and weathered the 1972-1973 anti-dissident campaign as well.

These "comebacks" indicate that the dissident movement has developed remarkable resiliency. Unless Brezhnev is succeeded by a neo-Stalinist on his "right,"<sup>36</sup> conditions for yet another recovery by the movement are probably better now than they were at any time in the past. The Soviet Union's human rights record will most likely fare badly at the 35-nation Helsinki Review Conference in the final quarter of 1977; a formidable, articulate and experienced coalition of emigré dissidents is continuing the struggle from the West; and, finally, both the internal and emigré dissidents now have the ear of a more critical and responsive West, Communist and non-Communist.

Add to this the roiling undercurrents of the ethnic and religious dissent that may well be irreversible in the long run, and Milovan Djilas' recent observation that dissent in Soviet society has become "inevitable, a kind of natural phenomenon" seems unusually prescient.<sup>37</sup> It is very probable that the Soviet dissident movement will continue to confront the Soviet regime, which progressively finds itself mired in a stalemate with a small group of its own citizens. Given the seemingly inexorable logic of repression and dissent, the incumbent Soviet leadership, paradoxically, may have become a prisoner of its own policy, a policy that seems destined to produce still more dissent. ■



## SOVIET POLICY IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 104)

state interests as he saw them. In so doing, he acted against the advice of Soviet leaders, who did not want to see the PLO beaten and were embarrassed at the spectacle of Syrians and Palestinians shooting at each other with Soviet guns, to the general benefit of the Lebanese Christians, the Israelis, and the Americans.<sup>16</sup>

The Soviet press could explain the Lebanese war as the result of a conspiracy of the imperialists and their lackeys, but it was in fact an Arab affair that ended with an Arab solution, first through Syria's military action and then by means of Saudi diplomacy. By drawing Egypt and Syria together after a year of feuding over the second Israeli-Egyptian agreement on Sinai and over events in Lebanon, the Saudis created a new Arab front—in which a chastened PLO still led by Yasser Arafat was given a place—ready for a new approach to a settlement with Israel that would return to the Arabs the Arab lands lost in the war of 1967. This group looked primarily to the new administration of President Jimmy Carter, which in their view could, if it would, put the necessary pressure on Israel.

### A POLICY OF PATIENCE

The Soviet leadership, disillusioned by the conduct of Syria and Egypt, had a radical option. The Soviet Union still had close ties with two Arab states that rejected the whole idea of negotiation or compromise with Israel and regarded the moderation of Egypt and Syria as treason to the Arab cause. These states were Iraq, governed by a rival branch of the Ba'th party and therefore a sworn enemy of Syria, and Libya, which under the erratic leadership of Muammar Qaddafi made a business of trying to overthrow governments he did not like, especially the Sadat regime in Egypt. Soviet leaders played up to Iraq and Libya, praised their revolutionary and progressive character (although Qaddafi's anticommunism and fanatical devotion to Islam cast some doubt on the strength of the ideological link), and supplied them with large quantities of arms. They could have adopted a policy of all-out support of Iraq and Libya and of the "rejectionist" factions of the PLO that found Arafat too moderate. Although such a

policy may not be ruled out for the future, in the circumstances of 1976 and the first half of 1977 Soviet leaders decided against it.

Libya and Iraq, even if they had had leaders whom the Kremlin could trust (which was not the case), provided too narrow a base for Soviet policy. As for the PLO, it had proved impossible for Moscow to control; and now, after losing in Lebanon, it was more susceptible to Arab than to Soviet direction. But the Soviet Union, which recognized Israel's right to exist, still preferred the tamer Arafat to the wild rejectionists, self-styled Marxists, who called for Israel's destruction.<sup>17</sup> Political weight in the Arab world still lay with Egypt and Syria, and financial power lay with Saudi Arabia. Without some assurance that radical forces could bring pro-Soviet regimes to power in Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, the radical course would simply drive the existing governments further to the West. Moreover, Soviet leaders were not ready to turn their backs publicly on the possibility of an Arab-Israeli settlement, although they insisted that the U.S.S.R. must have its proper role in negotiating and enforcing it. Soviet Secretary Leonid Brezhnev periodically issued policy statements to the effect that the time was ripe for the Geneva conference; all that was necessary was that Israel should be ready to yield the occupied territories and recognize the inalienable rights of the Palestinians, and then the U.S.S.R. would join others in guaranteeing the independence and security of all the states of the area, including Israel.<sup>18</sup>

It was important for the Soviet Union's standing with the Arabs that it should appear to be both for settlement and for the fulfillment of the conditions for peace set by the Arab side. And Soviet leaders also had to consider their relations with the United States. Were they to work openly to sabotage United States efforts toward peace in the Middle East, they would have a responsibility for the war likely to ensue, and for a likely new crisis in Soviet-American relations. And if the fragile structure of détente, already under new strains since the Carter administration came in, were to crack wide open in the Middle East, it would be a foolish risk for Soviet leaders unless they had the prospect of major strategic and political gains. There was no such prospect. The wisest course, then, was a policy of patience.

Similar considerations guided Soviet policy in the region of the Persian Gulf. There Moscow had flirted with the idea of backing the efforts of Iraq and the P.D.R.Y. to stir up a wave of revolutions against the traditional regimes in the oil-producing countries of the Gulf.<sup>19</sup> But revolutionary prospects were not promising, as the failure of the rebellion in Oman showed, and the Soviet Union was not going to risk its reasonably good relations with Iran for the sake of the will-o-the-wisp of radical revolution in the Gulf. When, in 1975, Iraq and Iran reached agreement in their disputes over boundaries, minority rights and the Kurdish rebellion,

<sup>16</sup> O. M. Smolansky, "Moscow and the Arab-Israeli Sector," *Current History*, October, 1976, p. 108.

<sup>17</sup> Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and the PLO*, Adelphi Papers, no. 131, (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 15-19.

<sup>18</sup> Y. Dmitriyev, "Middle East: Way to Peaceful Settlement," *International Affairs*, no. 3, 1977, pp. 47-52.

<sup>19</sup> A. Yodfat and M. Abir, *In the Direction of the Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1977), pp. 63-76.

it was evident to the Kremlin that these Gulf countries, confident in their possession of new "oil power," would follow their conception of national interests, without regard to treaties, aid relationships, socialist solidarity, or other aspects of their relations with the U.S.S.R. Even Iraq, while proclaiming her solidarity with the Soviet Union whenever high level visits took place between the two countries, was building up her relations with the West, selling her oil for hard currency, and looking to Europe, Japan and the United States for the capital goods and technology needed for rapid development. The Soviet Union, unable to compete with the West either as a customer for oil or as a provider of high quality goods, saw its influence decline in the rich and dynamic Gulf region even as it was attempting to build power in the regions beyond, in the Indian Ocean and in Africa.

Soviet fortunes in the Middle East in mid-1977 were indeed at a low ebb. They could hardly go anywhere but up, if only because so much was expected of the United States, both from the Arabs and from Israel, that United States diplomacy faced a nearly impossible task. And every American misstep on the road to peace or the mere absence of success in a situation where there was so much pressure for results would discredit those Middle Eastern leaders who had looked Westward for salvation and would open new possibilities for the Soviet Union.

Soviet policy is known for its patience and Soviet diplomats are sure in the knowledge that the only certainty in the Middle East is political change. Their continued buildup of military power strengthens the confidence of Soviet leaders that their interests in the Middle East and Africa will not be slighted or ignored by other powers or by local states. As the case of Angola showed, they might be prepared to take increased risks, even to the point of using their own forces. But the signs point to a continuation of the time-honored methods of political influence—the provision of arms; support for "progressive" (i.e. pro-Soviet) elements, and propaganda. Patience is justified by caution, but also by the conviction that has sustained Soviet leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev that, in the long run, the forces of history are on their side. ■

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## SOVIET POLICY IN EUROPE

*(Continued from page 108)*

leaders can take comfort from the general support they receive from West European Communists on most foreign policy issues. In the long run, this may be the most important aspect of Eurocommunism for the Soviet leadership.

In the short term, Eurocommunism is far more a challenge for the West than for the Soviet Union. If a NATO country were to go Communist, could it remain in an alliance created as a defense against the Soviet

Union? Can Communists be trusted with military secrets? Will the Communists, once they are in power, behave according to the rules of democratic politics?

Yet Eurocommunism also poses serious problems for Moscow. While the rising electoral popularity of West European Communist parties may weaken the position of the bourgeois anti-Soviet opposition, what can Moscow do to prevent the virus of Communist diversity from spreading to East Europe? Would the success of West European Communist parties encourage East Europeans to demand greater autonomy, thereby weakening the Soviet grip on its Warsaw Pact members? Is diversity a prelude to the disintegration of Moscow's hitherto dominant position in East Europe? Is there a spill-over effect from West European communism to East European communism?

## OBSERVATIONS

For the moment, no major crisis faces the Soviet leadership. However, the Kremlin's policy of drift and the relative tolerance of the last decade may not be adequate for the 1980's. The Soviet Union faces an aging leadership, an economy in chronic difficulty and a growing gap between the Soviet bloc and the West in many areas of technology. In a restive East Europe, human rights activists are surfacing to bedevil the anxious authoritarians in the party hierarchies. A point of no return may be approaching in the strategic arms relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus the Kremlin may soon have to come to grips with the new realities that are emerging in a changing Europe. Power alone will not be an adequate substitute for a coherent policy. The challenge goes to the very heart of Moscow's imperial position. ■

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## BREZHNEV'S YEAR

*(Continued from page 111)*

it the means of acquiring total control over the party and hence over the state. Only 19 years later did he assume the title of Premier. But the hold of a party secretary on power is informal, resting less on the legal authority of the office than on the command of a following in the party; and the leader who is merely party secretary may feel a little insecure. For the non-revolutionary, settled Communist system it is highly appropriate that the leader be legally and formally what he is de facto, head of the state.

The presidency is, in any case, the pinnacle of power for the onetime metallurgical engineer who rose mostly by making himself useful to Khrushchev, then stepped into his place and with utmost patience for 13 years moved his adherents up here and there and one by one demoted those on whom he could not rely. He has all along maintained forms of consultation, but he has now reached the point where he consults with persons de-

pendent upon himself. Only two fairly independent personalities remain at the top level: Kosygin, 72, who has long been ailing and is probably more desirous of retiring than of challenging anyone; and Mikhail Suslov, who is 75 and who, as the party's prime ideologist, has never been very active in policy questions.

Brezhnev has thus ascended the Everest of Soviet political power. There is nothing more for him to achieve, except perhaps a grotesque exaggeration of his personality cult like that of Kim Il-song, the living god of North Korea. Ironically, while the political Brezhnev is thus exalted, the flesh-and-blood Brezhnev is decadent; he takes on unlimited political powers and new responsibilities as his abilities wane. He has reportedly had at least two heart attacks and is under close medical surveillance. His face is usually puffy from some medication. His hearing has suffered, and he conspicuously uses a hearing aid. He has some problem with teeth and/or jawbone. His speech is somewhat slurred and labored. He is easily fatigued. His eyesight is poor, so that he reads from typescript in oversize letters. Most serious of all, his mind, like that of China's Chairman Mao Tse-tung in his last years, shows signs of wear, as he loses the thread of discourse and has to stop and search for words.

Probably Brezhnev has felt pressured to garner as many laurels and as much glory as possible while his strength holds out. It is possible that this has truly been his year and that the rest of his life is anticlimax. In all probability, Brezhnev wishes to avoid the fate of Stalin and Khrushchev as well as other former rulers of Communist states, whose reputations turned to obloquy when they lost the ability to reward and punish. If so, however, his unceremonious erasure of Podgorny, like the banishment of Khrushchev to oblivion, provides a poor precedent.

### THE SUCCESSION

Brezhnev has, however, apparently hesitated to undertake the most painful duty of an omnipotent ruler, to arrange his succession. No one is clearly in line. Apparently closest to Brezhnev is his stand-in, Andrei P. Kirilenko, secretary in charge of industry. But Kirilenko, who is actually a little older than Brezhnev, seems to have little personal standing aside from the confidence of the chief. More promising might be Fyodor D. Kulakov, secretary in charge of agriculture. He has recently been treated as number five in protocol rank, and he is (at 59) one of the very youngest men near the top. Sooner or later the present bracket of leaders in their seventies must yield. But they may resist as long as possible turning over power to a truly post-Stalin generation, not only because they like to hold power but also because they distrust those who have not passed through the trials they underwent. There has been no effort at all to move up-and-coming youngsters nearer to the top; on the contrary, younger

men have frequently been replaced by older ones. For example, at the meeting where Podgorny was removed, Konstantin F. Katushev, secretary in charge of relations with foreign ruling Communist parties, aged 50, was replaced by Konstantin V. Rusakov, aged 68.

Even if he does not live much longer, Brezhnev has the satisfaction of having placed his mark on Soviet history, of having remained as head of the ruling party longer than any leader except Stalin. He can be proud of the order and stability over which he has presided and of the massive growth of Soviet military power.

But in terms of fulfilling Lenin's dreams, his reign has hardly been a success. Economic growth has slowed, and dependence on imports from the capitalist West has grown. The governing apparatus has become ever more fixed, more of a ruling class. A new intellectual dissidence has arisen to turn the tables on what began as a party of intellectual dissidents. Most of all, the Soviet Union, which under Khrushchev still spoke in messianic tones, is no longer regarded as a model of the progressive transformation of society and has acquired the image of a staid bureaucracy, whose chief bureaucrat is Leonid Brezhnev. ■

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## SOVIET AGRICULTURE

(Continued from page 122)

Two factors may reduce the dependence of the Soviet Union on the United States for grain during the next five to ten years. One is a result of the grain agreement, and the other is the striking change in the world grain situation that has occurred since 1974.

The Soviet Union is able to minimize fluctuations in its grain imports by establishing a grain storage program, adding to stocks when grain crops are large, and drawing from stocks when grain crops are small. In the recent past, the government has permitted the demand for grain to grow more rapidly than the domestic supply, so that even when there was a bumper crop, usage nearly equaled production. When grain crops were average or below, net imports were required. The tenth five year plan calls for a substantial increase in storage capacity. If this program is carried out, it will be possible to hold reserves large enough to meet most grain production shortfalls.

In fact, the imports required by the agreement may, themselves, reduce whatever influence the United States might have had over Soviet policy. If the Soviet Union has a reasonably good grain crop in 1977 after the 1976 bumper crop, it may have substantial stocks by the end of the 1977 crop year. Essentially, all its imports from the United States would be added to stocks, thus minimizing its need to import if there were a poor crop in the future — as there will be.

The agreement plus actions taken to limit grain exports in prior years may well have convinced the Soviet

Union that the United States is an "unreliable supplier." The United States cannot be counted upon to permit the Soviet Union free and unhampered access to the American grain market. This view may have been a major impetus for a grain reserve program.

The world grain supply situation has changed significantly since 1974. Grain prices have declined substantially and are now at or near the levels prior to mid-1972 after discounting the effects of inflation. World grain stocks in mid-1977 are the largest on record and represent nearly the same percentage of annual production as they did in the late 1960's when stocks were considered to be too large. Thus the major grain exporters will once again seek to expand grain exports as an alternative to further stock accumulations, lower prices and restrictions on production. For the next several years, the Soviet Union may well face willing and eager sellers, just as it did in 1972. Except for very large import requirements, say in excess of 15 million tons, its dependence on the United States will not be very great.

With a grain storage program, including reserve stocks of up to 50 million tons, and with the change in the grain supply situation in international markets, the Soviet Union will not be significantly dependent on the United States or on the major grain exporters as a group.

This conclusion rests on the assumption that recent trends in Soviet grain production will continue. During 1971-1975, average grain yields were almost 45 percent greater than they had been a decade earlier. A study of the relationship between climate and grain production concludes that approximately half the increase in yields was due to improved climate. During 1971-1975, average annual precipitation in Soviet grain-growing regions was 22 percent heavier than in 1961-1965 and 20 percent heavier than the long-run average. The New Lands area in Kazakhstan, a region with marginal rainfall for grain production, appears to have been especially favored by recent weather.

It is a sobering thought for Soviet policymakers that in 1975, when the grain crop of 140 million tons was the smallest in a decade and 37 percent below the bumper crop of 1973, rainfall in the grain area was nearly identical to the average for 1961-1965 and only a little below the long-term average.

If climatic factors, especially rainfall, were less favorable during the next several years, Soviet grain production would fall significantly below the average level of 215 million-220 million tons planned for 1976-1980. The planned goals of livestock output in the tenth plan are much more modest than the goals of the previous plan. Meat output is planned to expand 7 to 11 percent, compared to 23 percent in the previous plan, and an actual increase of 21 percent in that period. Even with modest goals which, if achieved, would permit only a slight increase in per capita consumption, grain

requirements would equal or exceed planned production. Since the demand for livestock products is likely to increase more than the planned growth in output, any shortfall in grain production below plan levels will require a continuation of significant levels of grain imports.

The problems associated with Soviet agriculture that have plagued the Soviet economy for the past decade will continue. Agriculture will continue to require a very large fraction of national investment; the costs of producing farm products will remain at high levels; and there will be large year-to-year variability in production.

But United States-Soviet relations are not likely to be significantly affected by these difficulties, either positively or negatively. Soviet agricultural production is now so large that even when crops are poor there is no danger of famine. Production shortfalls can and do result in discomfort and grumbling but not in real hardship.

If the Soviet Union completes its plans to build sufficient storage capacity and follows a reasonable storage policy, the Soviet-American grain supply agreement and the increase in world grain stocks will mean that the Soviet Union will have adequate supplies to maintain livestock production even if it suffers two poor grain crops in a row. If relatively high average Soviet grain yields of recent years have been due to favorable weather, a return to more nearly average weather would place some additional strains on the Soviet economy. The Soviet Union would have to import considerably more grain and other feed materials than it has since 1971 or reduce the consumption of meat. Neither of these alternatives would be desirable. But it is unlikely that either of the alternatives, or a combination of them, would be decisive in affecting United States-Soviet relations. ■

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## SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

*(Continued from page 99)*

There were a number of reasons for these directives, many tied in with efforts to prevent any lowering of military preparedness following the 1967 reduction of conscription periods. But these directives also followed the desire to offset BMD obstacles to whatever extent possible through the further improvement of civil defense potentials. It is noteworthy that subsequent years saw a significant increase in the already formidable availability of literature on the implications of nuclear/chemical/biological war environments and advice on protective measures.

Finally, the third decision of this period was the assignment of increased priority to the quantitative and qualitative upgrading of the offensive arsenal. A consideration of the research and developmental lead time required for the 1974 extensive Soviet MIRV tests



indicates that the original diversion of significant funds was made in 1966-1967. (This analytical inference is supported by the data presented in the United States Central Intelligence Agency's [CIA's] February, 1976, report, "A Dollar Comparison of United States and Soviet Defense Activities, 1965-1975.")

By the mid-1970's evidence had accumulated that ongoing Soviet BMD research endeavors were accelerating, perhaps reflecting funds released by the success of the MIRV programs (one might again refer to the 1976 CIA report). There were numerous reports that Soviet testing was severely straining the spirit if not the letter of the research restrictions incorporated into SALT I. There were reports of new ABM models, and of novel associated radar developments. There was, furthermore, some evidence of efforts directed towards BMD concepts dispensing with ABM's, BMD concepts based on rapidly evolving laser potentials.

It may be said that Soviet leaders continue to accept MAD as an unpalatable but technologically necessary characteristic of the superpower balance. But they have not felt constrained to accept MAD as a characteristic of Soviet relations with other powers. BMD research is pursued with vigor. The requisite funding is undoubtedly authorized with some expectation that a degree of immunity against third powers can be perpetuated. Clearly, Soviet leaders hope for ultimate relief from MAD requirements vis-à-vis the United States. Emerging Soviet MIRV capabilities have made the Soviet Union somewhat less loath to challenge more dormant American BMD research efforts.

The ultimate potential of ballistic missile defense remains a matter of contention, subject to significant dispute in scientific circles. Though not undisputed, the American scientific consensus is that really effective laser-based BMD concepts belong to a distant future. A unilateral breakthrough is in any case unlikely, because of the extraordinary tentacles and interpenetration of the superpowers' intelligence services.

The Soviet Union has clearly become a global superpower. It has built a power-base commensurate with that of the United States and with its own self-perceived role and needs. Soviet leaders have acquired the means to act and react on distant seas and shores. Yet while the U.S.S.R. has negated United States predominance, it has not superseded it. Talk of Soviet superiority on the strategic arena is fatuous as long as mutual assured destruction, MAD, prevails as the operative characteristic of the strategic power balance. The only weapons innovation that might radically alter the fundamentals of the equilibrium is this highly questionable possibility of revolutionary total BMD's that would probably rely on high energy (laser) potentials. But few scientists expect such an evolution in the near future, if ever.

Having rid themselves of the reason for their sometimes paranoiac inferiority complex, Soviet leaders have

acquired a new confidence. Hence increased United States pressure for Jewish emigration was met by a decrease in actual emigration; hence Moscow's refusal to countenance the trade bill conditions imposed by the United States Congress in 1974. The U.S.S.R. cannot afford such obvious humiliations. Its chosen image, bolstered by increasing confidence, demands "equality" — and respect.

But Soviet leaders also recognized their limitations. They were cautious in Chile and in Portugal. Soviet restraint in these arenas, like Soviet caution on the question of the 1976 Italian election, indicates that Soviet leaders acknowledge the finite nature of their increased freedom of maneuver. And the fact that the Soviet Union has continued her Lend-Lease repayments even after the demise of the 1972 negotiated trade agreement with the United States points to a continuing Soviet desire for the beneficent, technological or otherwise, of increased East-West commercial exchanges.

Except perhaps on the periphery, the U.S.S.R. is likely to depend less on the physical exploitation of her military means and more on the political manipulation of the perceptions they engender. Even on the periphery, Soviet flexing of new-found muscle and United States flexing of enduring prowess are likely to be carefully controlled and calibrated. The reality if perhaps not the appearance of direct confrontation is likely to be avoided.

The Soviet Union will assert its voice and interest on distant conflicts with greater persuasiveness than hitherto. It will become even less "ignorable." But for the foreseeable future, it is likely to see its interests best served through "détente," current political tensions notwithstanding. Both superpowers see direct conflict as inconceivable, indirect conflict as too dangerous, the "pragmatic" benefits of accommodation as too tempting.

The relationship between the superpowers may retain elements of antagonism, witness the hollowness of current arms control negotiations. And they may retain aspirations to preeminence, witness Moscow's continued funding of BMD research. But they appear to have decided that, as long as MAD remains a fact of life, pragmatic accommodation is mutually advantageous. Their respective motives may differ, apart from the common fear of mutual suicide, but both the United States and the Soviet Union have come to focus on the benefit to be extracted from a muting of residual antipathies. Examples of Soviet caution could be juxtaposed against President Jimmy Carter's election campaign declaration that the United States would not intervene physically in Yugoslavia (the reality may have been old, but the explicitness was novel).

It is ironic. The superpowers are far more "super" in the sense of military superiority than most observers realize. Yet they have perceived that their shared pre-

eminence makes it all the more important that they cooperate. Their very isolation at the top of the military heap has made them increasingly dependent on one another.

Finally, two small notes. First: the fact that the superpowers may be practically immune to the military potential of third powers as that potential is traditionally defined, does not mean that they are equally secure from less traditional forms of onslaught—domestic or external—a question worthy of considerably more debate than has hitherto occurred.

Second, and perhaps not unrelated, many observers believe that the current superpower offensive arsenals are in large measure redundant—even to aspirations for hegemony. They regard the quantitative nature of current capabilities as caricature extremes of “worst-case” prognostications; they see them as entailing such over-over-kill capabilities as could not have been justified even by the degradation factors once associated with the most primitive first generational missiles.

And they are probably right: as long as MAD remains the operative characteristic of the strategic balance, as long as effective defenses against superpower penetration potentials are not deployed, current arsenals are difficult to justify. Instead of 2,400 delivery vehicles each, including 1,320 MIRV's (these are the latest, as yet unratified guidelines, negotiated by United States President Gerald Ford and Soviet Communist party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at Vladivostok in 1974), one could make a forceful case that 50 or 100 of the more modern MIRV missiles would suffice to guarantee the devastation of the opponent.

In military terms, a limited number of nonvulnerable, sea-based MIRV missiles, for example, should constitute a logically secure deterrent. Additional deployments may therefore owe their rationale to psychological and other calculations, which emanate from bureaucratic politics, inter-service rivalries and “military-industrial complex” requirements. A number of current military procurement programs clearly owe their existence to such considerations; many could, in fact, only be justified by reference to the larger amalgam of established concerns and subjective perceptions of their political import, domestically and/or in the external arena. ■

## SOVIET ASIA

(Continued from page 127)

country. Another advantage of this philosophy, emphasized by proponents of multifaceted development of the west Siberian oilfields, is that it becomes worthwhile to exploit (or, from another viewpoint, helps to spread the national demand for) minor local resources ranging from building stone to thermal springs.

The other side of the coin is that demand for the major resources is already established west of the Urals; resources closer to existing demand must be replaced and exports must be provided, instead of meeting incre-

mental domestic demand that might be directed to Siberia. Finally, it is expensive to build up industry and population in remote regions lacking infrastructure, especially when people do not wish to live there. The last point is crucial. The government still mobilizes Komsomol volunteers for special construction projects, directs college graduates to assigned work for three years and restricts migration to big cities; but in general it has swung away from labor direction since the 1950's. People in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where population growth is still rapid, have shown little desire to migrate to Siberia. Migration has been mainly from the European U.S.S.R., but for trained workers there are many jobs back home, where the natural growth of the labor force has slowed down. Amenities, too, are usually more available there. Consequently, Siberia has been suffering labor shortages, rapid turnover and even net out-migration.

Clearly, although most energy production west of the Yenisey must move to the European U.S.S.R., some can be retained to build up industry locally. The question of how much should be retained in the region has formed part of a protracted debate between “Europeans” and “Siberians” on the relative merits in general of investment west and east of the Urals. The debate has been reviewed by Leslie Dienes.<sup>17</sup> His estimates suggest that the government has favored Siberia more than could be justified by the relative productivity of investment capital. In Siberia, however, the government has toned down early visions of big cities in the wilderness. The initial plans for Surgut, Nadym and other new towns on the oil and gas fields later became more modest. Some industries and ancillary activities were relocated to established Siberian cities like Tyumen' and Tomsk.<sup>18</sup> Apart from reducing costs, it was evidently felt that established cities could attain a size and scale of amenities more attractive to immigrants. In effect, a hierarchy of settlements was planned, from cities to “duty tour” camps at drilling sites. Between spells of duty, workers would return to their families in the larger cities.<sup>19</sup>

Ekibastuz coal is being used both locally—to build up the Pavlodar industrial complex—and far afield, to fuel power stations in the Urals. Electricity generated locally is expected to reach Moscow by extra high voltage (EHV) transmission in a few years.<sup>20</sup> It is

<sup>17</sup>Dienes, *Annals*, op. cit., vol. 62, no. 3 (September, 1972), pp. 437-454.

<sup>18</sup>Robert N. North, “Soviet Northern Development: The Case of Northwestern Siberia,” *Soviet Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2 (October, 1972), pp. 171-199.

<sup>19</sup>Problems in the implementation of this policy are examined in “How Northern Housing Went Wrong,” *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 28, no. 24 (July 14, 1976), pp. 1-4. Condensed from *Pravda*, June 18, p. 2, and June 19, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup>Theodore Shabad, “News Notes,” *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, vol. 17, no. 1 (January, 1976), p. 67.

hoped that transmission will eventually be feasible for East Siberian electricity,<sup>21</sup> but for the present the government has chosen to create major power-based industrial complexes locally, as it is also doing in Central Asia. The two best known complexes in East Siberia are based on the Bratsk and Sayan hydroelectric stations. In response to the labor situation, it was announced that Siberian developments would have energy-intensive industries like aluminum smelting but that labor-intensive industries would be concentrated in the European U.S.S.R. Bratsk, however, has already acquired some light industry, possibly to redress an imbalance between males and females—a perennial Siberian problem.<sup>22</sup> It has grown from a construction camp in the 1950's to a modern city of 200,000 people, most of them young and attracted by high wages, comfortable facilities and generous holiday and pension provisions. Bratsk clearly represents one intended path for Siberian, resource-based, regional development. Whether this type of industrial complex will solve the labor problem has still to be proved. There is apparently considerable turnover even at Akademgorodok, the research center near Novosibirsk. The government has gone to great pains to make life there attractive and to create a pattern for further decentralization.

The principal underused agricultural resources of Soviet Asia are Siberian water and Central Asian sunshine. The prospect of linking these resources by diverting the northward-flowing Siberian rivers southward has evoked a succession of grandiose schemes in the true Soviet tradition.<sup>23</sup> All have favored the Turgay Gap as the corridor to Central Asia, but the proposed diversion dams have been shifted upstream as the disadvantages of flooding the west Siberian plain have become apparent. Official research is now focused on the scheme depicted on the map,<sup>24</sup> but implementation time should probably be measured in decades. In the meantime, irrigation is being extended according to smaller schemes, like the recently completed Irtysh-

Karaganda canal that also carries water for industry. The attractions of water transfer are clear: grain yields under irrigation range from 50 to 100 percent above the national average and fluctuate much less. But potential ecological problems are horrendous, and the fate of the big schemes will presumably depend on whether agricultural output can be raised by cheaper, safer methods.

The last resource considered here is labor. The Slavic labor force is growing very slowly compared with the labor force of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Consequently, the southern regions should be increasingly attractive for labor-intensive industries. But, the Central Asian labor surplus has not yet become a strong attractive force. Investment in the region has risen more than anywhere else in the country since 1950 (table 2), but this is due in large measure to natural gas, non-ferrous metal and chemical projects, and latterly to the Nurek hydroelectric station and industrial complex. None of these industries are markedly labor-intensive. However, growing regional differences in labor availability are almost sure to affect development.<sup>25</sup>

This analysis has assumed a rising national demand for resources and continuing relative national autarchy. There seems no reason to challenge the first assumption but the second may be challenged. A wholehearted switch to an open economy seems most unlikely, but Soviet policies towards foreign trade and foreign involvement in Soviet resource exploitation have certainly been changing. The changes may well affect the development of Soviet Asia.

Siberian resources can be very expensive to exploit for the domestic European market, let alone for export. Yet they are in strong demand domestically, and they are no less urgently needed for export. There are two major sources of pressure to export. First, the Soviet Union wishes to import technology and sometimes food from outside the Communist bloc. Current policies favor expanding technological imports, and they must be paid for. The most acceptable Soviet exports are raw materials, particularly oil and natural gas. At current world prices, oil and natural gas are also preferred exports from the Soviet viewpoint: in 1975, they accounted for over 50 percent by value of all exports to non-Communist Europe, the main source of technological imports. Second, the Soviet government wishes to foster the economic integration of the East European nations in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Integration based on reciprocal needs requires the Soviet Union to supply East Europe with raw materials, especially, oil and natural gas, and to accept manufactures in exchange. As integration has progressed, the northern COMECON countries with developed industrial economies have become heavily dependent on Soviet natural resources.

The Soviet government has reacted to these pressures in several ways. It has tried to increase exports of manufactured goods, so far with limited success in the case

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 17, no. 7 (September, 1976), pp. 492-493.

<sup>22</sup>The problem is discussed at length in V. P. Yevstigneyev, "The Location of Metal-Intensive and Labor-Intensive Industries in the Eastern Regions," *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, vol. 17, no. 5 (May, 1976), pp. 314-324.

<sup>23</sup>For a review of these schemes, see Philip P. Micklin, "NAWAPA and Two Siberian Water-Diversion Proposals: A Geographical Comparison and Appraisal," *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, vol. 18, no. 2 (February, 1977), pp. 81-99.

<sup>24</sup>For a detailed map, see *ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

<sup>25</sup>Problems of utilizing Central Asian labor are discussed in "Urbanization Problems in Central Asia," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 28, no. 4 (February 25, 1976), pp. 1-3 (translated from *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, January 28, p. 2); "Regional Planning in the Soviet Economy" (see note 13); and "The Tadzhik Complex's Manpower Problem," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 28, no. 46 (December 15, 1976), pp. 11-12 (translated from *Pravda*, November 14, p. 2).



of Western industrial nations.<sup>26</sup> It has also supported producers' cartels for raw materials, hoping that the value of other Soviet exports will rise, relative to the value of manufactures imported, as has happened with energy sources.<sup>27</sup> The Soviet government has also raised the price of oil to its East European partners and has pressed them to buy oil elsewhere and to mine expensive local lignite. This is having disastrous effects on East European budgets; non-COMECON oil still costs more and normally must be paid for in hard currency.

Pursuing its own economic policies, the Soviet regime has entered into long-term "compensatory agreements" with Western countries, obtaining, for example, credits to buy gas pipeline and equipment in exchange for a 20-year Soviet guarantee to supply natural gas. Similar agreements have involved East Europe in exploiting the Soviet natural resources it needs. The best-known project in Siberia is the Ust'-Il'msk pulp and paper enterprise.<sup>28</sup> The Soviet Union has also expanded other foreign earnings, for example, by setting up a successful container service along the Siberian railway. Finally, it has tried to increase exports to Japan—more conveniently located than European countries in relation to Soviet Far Eastern resources—and to involve Japan in exploration and exploitation. Japan has balked at helping build an oil pipeline all the way from western Siberia but is cooperating in offshore prospecting in the Far East. Japan also supplies forestry and mining equipment on credit, to be paid for in wood and coal.

The most favored Soviet economic measures, both of which affect Soviet Asia, seem to be long-term compensatory agreements and the exploitation of Far Eastern resources for export eastward. The latter is being supported by heavy investment to build the Baykal-Amur Mainline (BAM), parallel to the Siberian railway but farther north (see map).<sup>29</sup> On completion in 1983, the line is to carry oil from western Siberia, as well as coal, copper and other minerals tapped en

route, to Pacific ports. The stated goal of 25 million tons of oil, out of 35 million tons of line capacity, looks surprising if one compares the trend of west Siberian production with national demand and exports westward, but presumably it is hoped that more oil will be found closer to the Pacific.

In summary, it appears that over the next 10 to 15 years, Soviet Asian development will be affected most strongly by an intense demand for Siberian resources, especially energy resources. In other words, current trends will continue. Further new energy-intensive enterprises will be located east of the Urals, but the breadth of regional development will not match the visions of early Soviet writers. Energy sources, metals and forest products will continue to move over long distances westward and, increasingly, eastward, and foreign capital will finance—but not control—resource exploitation and transport facilities.

There are three points of doubt concerning this forecast. Western bankers and governments are concerned about the mounting indebtedness of the COMECON countries, linked in part to the long-term compensatory agreements. Although direct Soviet debts are relatively well secured by resources, the greater concern is for the East Europeans, who have entered into their own agreements with Western countries (involving, for example, the purchase of factories and payment in products), and have obtained loans to finance their compensatory agreements with the Soviet Union.<sup>30</sup> Doubt has also been expressed in the Soviet Union about the long-term commitment of resources to export at the possible cost of domestic shortages. It must also be remembered that the compelling advantages of exporting oil outside COMECON could vanish with the OPEC cartel.

In the longer term, it seems likely that Central Asian labor resources and the transfer southward of Siberian water will be major influences on Soviet Asian development. The role of Siberian energy resources will depend on the rate and scale of oil and gas discoveries and the trend of world energy prices. Given sufficiently high prices, east Siberian coal and water power could conceivably support energy-intensive industry on an international scale, importing raw and exporting processed materials despite high transport costs.

The final imponderable is the role of China. The Soviet-Chinese split spoiled ambitious plans for joint development of the River Amur and probably contributed to the decision to build BAM rather than branches from the Siberian railway. China was the Soviet Union's biggest trading partner in the 1950's, accounting for one-fifth of its foreign trade. Reconciliation with an industrializing China could drastically alter the potential of Soviet Asia's natural resources and the course of regional development. If this reconciliation does not occur, developments east of Lake Baykal will depend on Japan and on the successful exploitation of alternative trading opportunities in the Pacific.<sup>31</sup> ■

<sup>26</sup>V. Klochek, "Soviet Foreign Trade on the Eve of the Tenth Five-Year Plan," *Foreign Trade*, 1976, no. 5, pp. 8-15; N. Krainev, "Soviet-Canadian Trade," *Foreign Trade*, 1976, no. 6, pp. 12-14.

<sup>27</sup>A. Ivanov and V. Polezhaev, "Urgent Problems of International Trade in Primary Material," *Foreign Trade*, 1976, no. 5, pp. 40-46; K. Bakhtov and V. Zoloyev, "Soviet Primary Product Exports Today," *Foreign Trade*, 1977, no. 2, pp. 12-13.

<sup>28</sup>"Comecon Helps Build Siberian Pulp Mill," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 26, no. 18 (May 29, 1974), p. 11. Translated from *Izvestiya*, May 1.

<sup>29</sup>Theodore Shabad and Victor L. Mote, *Gateway to Siberian Resources* (Washington: Scripta, 1977).

<sup>30</sup>*The Economist*, May 28, 1977, p. 100. For a Soviet reaction to this kind of difficulty, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 28, no. 36 (October 6, 1976), p. 16. Translated from *Izvestiya*, September 10, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup>This topic is examined in Paul Dibb, *Siberia and the Pacific. A Study of Economic Development and Trade Prospects* (New York: Praeger, 1972).



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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of August, 1977, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Arms Control

Aug. 30—The Geneva Disarmament Conference closes its sessions for 1977; the 30-nation meeting reports some gains toward an understanding between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on banning chemical weapons and underground nuclear tests.

### Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Aug. 4—The leadership meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations begins in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Aug. 6—Prime Ministers of Japan, Australia and New Zealand meet with the leaders of the 5 ASEAN countries to discuss trade ties.

### Conference on European Security and Cooperation

Aug. 5—The Belgrade Conference on European Security ends after 7 weeks after adopting a compromise agenda for a main meeting to take place in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on October 4, when delegates from 33 nations will meet to review any progress made since the Helsinki arms control accords of 1975.

### Middle East

Aug. 4—After meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Damascus, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad refuses to agree to an Egyptian proposal that a group of Arab and Israeli foreign ministers meet in the U.S. in September to prepare for a Geneva conference; he fears that the meeting would compete with the Geneva conference, where Palestinian rights should be recognized.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat meets in Cairo with Yasir Arafat, Palestine Liberation Organization head, to brief him on the talks Sadat held with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

Aug. 6—In a hard-line statement after a 2-day meeting in Damascus, the PLO legislative council rules against possible talks with Carter administration officials.

In a news conference in Amman, Jordan, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance reports that Israelis and Arabs still disagree on the issues of Palestinian rights and Israeli withdrawals from occupied Arab lands.

Aug. 7—U.S. Secretary of State Vance goes to Taif, Saudi Arabia; just before Vance leaves Jordan King Hussein says that he is "cautiously optimistic" about the chances for a Middle East peace settlement.

Aug. 8—Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin declares that Israel will not permit the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in Middle East peace talks.

Aug. 11—King Hussein of Jordan asks Arabs to unite.

In an interview in Jerusalem, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan says he is "optimistic" about the possibility of peace treaties with Arab countries.

Aug. 12—Syrian President Assad refuses to support an American-sponsored proposal for "proximity talks"

between Arab and Israeli foreign ministers at the United Nations in September.

Aug. 14—Abdul Hamid Sharaf, chief of the Royal Court of Jordan, says that Jordan will consider a peace treaty with Israel only in the context of an overall Arab-Israeli peace treaty.

Aug. 19—Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy calls Israeli moves to permit settlements on the Jordan River West Bank a "violation of her international obligations and an aggression on Arab rights and legitimacy."

Aug. 24—According to reports from Beirut, the Soviet Union has advised the PLO against hastily agreeing to U.N. Security Council resolution 242, which recognizes that Israel has a right to exist inside secure borders.

Aug. 30—Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin reiterates that Israel will refuse to deal with the PLO under any conditions.

### Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Aug. 25—The Organization of African Unity, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, calls the South African-sponsored talks on the status of South West Africa unacceptable to its members, because the South West Africa People's Organization has not been allowed to attend the Windhoek constitutional talks.

### United Nations

Aug. 22—Opening a 5-day World Conference for Action against Apartheid in Lagos, Nigeria, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim says that a national convention representing all the people of South Africa would be the best way to solve the apartheid problems of that country.

Aug. 29—A U.N. Conference on Deserts begins a 12-day session in Nairobi, Kenya.

### World Law Conference

Aug. 26—With more than 4,000 in attendance, the World Law Conference closes a 5-day meeting in Manila; the conference calls for an international court to try terrorists and hijackers.

## ARGENTINA

Aug. 10—The government reports that the cost of living increased 7.6 percent in July; the total increase for 7 months of 1977 is 64.1 percent over 1976.

## AUSTRALIA

Aug. 19—Parliament votes to outlaw government workers' strikes.

Aug. 25—Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser rescinds the ban on mining and exporting uranium; the country has one-fifth of the non-Communist world's known supply of uranium.

## BERMUDA

Aug. 26—J. David Gibbons, newly elected leader of the

United Bermuda party, is sworn in as Prime Minister; he succeeds Prime Minister John Sharpe.

### CANADA

- Aug. 7—Air traffic controllers go on strike nationwide in a wage dispute with the government.
- Aug. 10—Striking air traffic controllers return to work following parliamentary action that imposes a one-year contract on the controllers; the government authorized an average pay increase of 7.4 percent.
- Aug. 12—Statistics Canada reports the annual rate of inflation at 8.1 percent, 2 percent above the goal set by the Finance Ministry at the beginning of the year.
- Aug. 26—In Quebec, the provincial assembly approves legislation to ensure the primacy of French in the province.

### CHILE

- Aug. 12—President Augusto Pinochet announces that the National Intelligence Directorate, the secret police, has been abolished; it is replaced by the National Information Center.

### CHINA

- Aug. 6—In Peking, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng meets with U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, who is in China for a week-long visit.
- Aug. 20—Peking Radio broadcasts a report announcing the conclusion of the 11th Congress of the Communist party, the first party congress held since the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Members are elected to the Central Committee, which is made up of 201 regular members and 132 alternate delegates.
- Aug. 21—The composition of the Politburo is announced; it includes: party Chairman Hua, Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying and Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping.
- Aug. 22—In Peking, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance arrives for talks with Chinese leaders.
- Aug. 23—Hsinhua, the government press agency, publishes the new constitution of the Communist party.
- Aug. 24—Secretary Vance meets with Teng Hsiao-ping in the Great Hall of the People.
- Aug. 29—Following discussions with U.S. Secretary Vance in Peking, Politburo member Li Hsien-nien says the "Chinese people are quite unhappy" with the Carter administration's policy of supporting "his [Carter's] old friend" Taiwan.
- Aug. 30—In Peking, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito meets with Deputy Prime Minister Hua; this is Tito's first visit to China.

### CUBA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Aug. 11—In a joint communiqué issued in Havana, President Fidel Castro and U.S. Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) announce that 80 U.S. citizens will be permitted to leave for the U.S. with their Cuban families.

### CYPRUS

- Aug. 3—Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, dies of a heart attack at the age of 63. He served as President since Cyprus gained independence from Great Britain in 1960.
- Aug. 31—Acting President Spyros Kytrianou is sworn in as President to complete the term of the late Archbishop Makarios.

### EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

### ETHIOPIA

- Aug. 8—In Addis Ababa, the government radio reports that a "full-scale war" is being waged between Somalis and Ethiopians in Ogaden Province.
- Aug. 9—Ethiopian ambassador to Kenya Mengiste Desta claims that Somali forces are using jet fighters and tanks in Ogaden and that they have achieved a "temporary" advantage there.
- Aug. 13—Somali Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre says that Somali forces have taken control of 97 percent of Ogaden Province.
- Aug. 15—In Mogadishu, radio broadcasts report an Ethiopian invasion in Somalia along their joint border. The radio reports warn Somalis to prepare for a full invasion by Ethiopian soldiers.
- Aug. 16—The Ethiopian News Agency reports that Ethiopian planes have strafed Somali tanks and trucks in the Rift Valley, 250 miles north of the Ogaden region.
- Aug. 17—It is reported that Diredawa, the 4th largest city in Ethiopia, is under a heavy mortar attack by Somalia.
- Aug. 20—Lieutenant Colonel Megistu Haile Mariam orders a national mobilization.

### FRANCE

- Aug. 31—President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announces a \$1 billion economic program to stimulate the economy; the program includes additional credits for public works projects, an increase in aid to low-income families, and a 1 percent reduction in the central bank's discount rate.

### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

- Aug. 10—The unemployment rate for the month of July is reported at 4.3 percent, up from 4.1 percent in June.

### INDIA

- Aug. 1—A government report charges that the administration of Indira Gandhi manipulated the press, radio and television and undermined the credibility of the media.
- Aug. 15—10 advisers to former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi are arrested on charges of corruption; 4 of the 10 were among the innermost circle of the Gandhi administration.
- Aug. 23—Gandhi's Defense Minister and close adviser is arrested and charged with misappropriating Congress party funds.

### INDONESIA

- Aug. 19—An earthquake registering between 7.7 and 8.9 on the Richter scale hits in the Indian Ocean between Australia and Indonesia.
- Aug. 22—Early casualty reports indicate that more than 150 people were killed in the August 19 earthquake and the tidal wave that followed.

### IRAN

- Aug. 7—Prime Minister Amir Abass Hoveyda submits his resignation to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi. Hoveyda served as Prime Minister for more than 12 years.

### ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Lebanon; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 10—The Finance Ministry eases restrictions on individual citizens holding foreign currencies in bank accounts.

Aug. 14—The Cabinet votes to extend government services to all residents of the occupied West Bank area and the Gaza Strip.

Aug. 17—Cabinet spokesman Aryeh Naor announces the government's decision to begin construction of 3 new Israeli settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

Aug. 25—Prime Minister Menahem Begin arrives in Bucharest for 4 days of talks with Romanian officials.

Aug. 31—After 3 years of disagreement, the Israeli government allows the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to send a fact-finding team to Israeli-held Arab territories to study Arab culture.

### JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

### KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (North)

Aug. 1—The North Korean press agency reports the establishment of a "military sea boundary" that applies to civilian and military ships and planes. The zone extends 50 miles from the shoreline on the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. A 200-mile fishing zone also goes into effect.

A ferry boat from South Korea carrying 465 passengers successfully reaches a South Korean-held island 10 miles off the North Korean coast in the Yellow Sea. South Korea refuses to recognize the military sea boundaries.

### KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See *Korea, North; U.S., Political Scandal*)

### LEBANON

Aug. 8—On the eve of a visit by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin admits that Israeli troops are assisting right-wing Christian forces against left-wing Palestinians in southern Lebanon.

Aug. 17—Heavy fighting between right-wing Christian forces and left-wing Palestinians is reported near the Israeli border in southern Lebanon.

Aug. 21—Heavy fighting between Christians and Muslims breaks out in the Chuf mountain region south of Beirut. Syrian peacekeeping troops are sent to the area; 17 people are reported killed.

Aug. 25—A bomb explodes in a Beirut market killing 3 people and wounding 12.

### MEXICO

Aug. 5—It is reported that the recently appointed ambassador to Spain, Díaz Ordaz, has unexpectedly resigned for reasons of health.

### NETHERLANDS

Aug. 27—Queen Juliana names Gerhard Veringa to mediate the dispute among the rival parties over a proposed abortion reform law; partly because of the abortion issue, the caretaker government of Prime Minister Joop den Uyl has been unable to form a coalition government since the May 25 elections.

### PAKISTAN

Aug. 1—Chief election commissioner Mushtaq Hussein sets October 18, 1977, as the date for general elections promised by the new government of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq.

Aug. 20—The government removes all censorship from radio and television.

### PANAMA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

### PERU

Aug. 29—President Francisco Morales Bermudez lifts the 13-month-old state of emergency and restores constitutional guarantees.

### PHILIPPINES

Aug. 27—President Ferdinand E. Marcos orders the release of 500 martial law prisoners; in the last 2 months 1,500 political prisoners have been released.

### PORTUGAL

Aug. 11—Parliament votes 166 to 86 to approve the government's controversial land-reform program.

### RHODESIA

Aug. 6—In Salisbury, a bomb explodes in a crowded store, killing 11 people and injuring 76.

Aug. 10—In a remote area in the southwestern section, 2 missionaries are killed by black nationalist guerrillas.

Aug. 12—In the U.N., leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union Joshua Nkomo calls for the resignation of Prime Minister Ian Smith before a transfer of power to the black majority.

In London, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, U.K. Foreign Minister David Owen, and South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha meet to work out a proposal for the peaceful transfer of power to the black majority.

Aug. 13—In London, Cyrus Vance meets with Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere.

Aug. 21—Elliott Gabellah, vice president of the United African National Council led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, resigns. Gabellah is expected to join forces with moderate leader Ndabaningi Sithole, who returned from exile last month.

Aug. 26—Prime Minister Smith says that he will reject British-American peace proposals if they call for his resigning and dismantling Rhodesian security forces.

Aug. 29—Following discussions with black nationalist leaders Owen and Young meet with South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Pretoria, South Africa.

Aug. 31—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held. Incomplete election returns give the Rhodesian Front party led by Prime Minister Smith 90 percent of the vote.

### SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

### SOMALIA

(See also *Ethiopia*)

Aug. 31—Following two days of talks with Soviet leaders, President Mohammed Siad Barre leaves Moscow.

### SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, OAU; Rhodesia*)

Aug. 8—In Moscow, the Soviet press agency Tass reports

that South Africa "... is now nearing completion [of a] nuclear weapon and preparations are being held for carrying out tests."

Aug. 17—In Soweto township, police complete 3 days of raids on township schools to stop illegal takeovers by students; 170 students are arrested.

Aug. 19—The government is reportedly preparing to present to Parliament major revisions of the constitution. The plan calls for abolishing the present parliamentary system and replacing it with a presidential system similar to the French model. The new proposal would give Asians and those of mixed race, but not blacks, representation in the new government.

Aug. 23—Prime Minister John Vorster denies that his country is planning to conduct any nuclear tests "now or in the future."

### SPAIN

Aug. 28—Nearly 75,000 supporters of the Basque separatist movement stage a rally in Pamplona to demand political autonomy.

### SRI LANKA

Aug. 20—Prime Minister J. R. Jayewardene imposes a 3-day nationwide curfew in an attempt to end the violence against the Tamil minority in Colombo.

Aug. 24—The government begins airlifting Tamil refugees from Colombo.

Aug. 26—The government reports that violence is subsiding in Colombo; some 56 people have been killed and 3,000 arrested in the week-long disorder.

### SYRIA

(See *Intl. Middle East*)

### TANZANIA

(See also *Rhodesia*)

Aug. 4—In Washington, D.C., President Julius K. Nyerere meets with U.S. President Jimmy Carter for talks about the U.S.-British proposals for the transfer of power in Rhodesia.

### TURKEY

Aug. 1—The coalition government of Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel wins a vote of confidence in the National Assembly.

### UGANDA

Aug. 17—In Nairobi, exiled army Lieutenant Stephen Mutengo says that a playwright, the director of the national theater and an official in the Ministry of Culture have been executed by firing squad for insulting President Idi Amin.

### U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl. Middle East; Somalia*)

Aug. 16—In response to U.S. President Jimmy Carter's speech on U.S.-Soviet relations in Charleston, South Carolina, last month, President Leonid A. Brezhnev says, "... these statements sound positive ... we will willingly look for mutually acceptable solutions."

Aug. 17—In Moscow, press reports claim that *Arktika*, a nuclear icebreaker, has successfully reached the North Pole.

Aug. 19—Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and President Brezhnev issue a joint communiqué after Tito's departure endorsing the "different ways of Socialist development."

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Great Britain

(See also *Rhodesia*)

Aug. 10—Queen Elizabeth II arrives in Belfast, protected by the largest security force ever assembled in Northern Ireland.

Aug. 12—Employment Minister Harold Walker reports that retail prices are up 0.1 percent for the month of July; the inflation rate is 6.6 percent for July, down from 9.3 percent in June; the balance of payments deficit dropped from \$141.75 million in June to \$63 million in July.

Aug. 13—Right-wing militants belonging to the National Front march through a multiracial neighborhood in South London; fighting breaks out between right-wing marchers and left-wing supporters of the All-Lewisham Campaign Against Racism and Fascism; 148 people are arrested.

Aug. 25—Air traffic controllers go on strike in a wage dispute with the government.

## UNITED STATES

### Administration

Aug. 1—The first shipment of crude oil from the Alaskan pipeline is loaded aboard the S.S. *Arco Juneau* for shipment to the continental U.S.

According to *The New York Times*, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded a 25-year, \$25-million research project into behavior and thought control over human beings in a number of government and private research institutions in the U.S. and Canada.

Aug. 3—According to White House sources, President Carter plans to give CIA director Admiral Stansfield Turner control of the whole national intelligence budget, including the budget for the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office.

In a 7-page message to Congress, President Carter suggests legislation to provide legal status for aliens who entered the U.S. before 1977.

U.S. District Judge John Dooling, Jr., withdraws his temporary order of last week requiring the federal government to finance elective abortions for indigent patients; Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano, Jr., acts immediately to ban nearly all federal funding of abortions.

Aug. 5—The first oil from the trans-Alaskan pipeline arrives in Washington.

Aug. 6—In a message to Congress, President Carter proposes a comprehensive restructuring of the nation's welfare system. The new system would emphasize a work-requirement plan: up to 1.4 million public service jobs would be created if necessary; earned income tax credit and revised income payments would be included. The program, whose total cost is estimated at \$40 billion, would become effective in fiscal 1981.

Aug. 17—President Carter names U.S. District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Aug. 18—Comptroller of the Currency John Heimann reports that, although Director of the Office of Management and Budget Bert Lance followed questionable personal borrowing practices, he "does not believe the information developed to date in the inquiry warrants the prosecution of any individuals."

Aug. 22—White House Press Secretary Jody Powell says that 5 campaign flights by President Carter in 1975 and 1976 on a plane owned by the National Bank of Georgia "probably should be considered" as political campaign



trips; they were not paid for through an oversight and will be paid for now.

Aug. 26—The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit validates the granting of over \$1 billion in leases by the federal government to oil companies for oil-drilling rights off the east coast of the U.S.

Aug. 29—At a White House briefing, Acting Agriculture Secretary John White says that President Carter will ask Congress to authorize a 20 percent cutback in wheat acreage; he plans to order between 30 million and 35 million tons of food and feed grains to be placed in reserve before the 1978-1979 marketing season. Under the Carter plan, farmers who do not cut back wheat acreage would forfeit government subsidies.

## Civil Rights

Aug. 4—In a 2-1 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia says that the 1,200 antiwar demonstrators arrested at a rally on the Capitol steps on May 5, 1971, were arrested illegally but rules that a \$12-million damage award is excessive.

Aug. 15—Georgia state Senator Julian Bond says that President Carter has not fulfilled campaign promises to the blacks and the poor who helped to elect him to the presidency.

Aug. 26—On the 57th anniversary of the 19th Amendment, which granted women the right to vote, President Carter issues a Woman's Equality Day proclamation that calls for the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.

## Economy

Aug. 5—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate fell to 6.9 percent in July.

Aug. 10—The Commerce Department reports that retail sales in the U.S. increased by 0.5 percent in July, after declining for 3 months.

Aug. 11—The Labor Department reports that the wholesale price index fell 0.1 percent in July.

Aug. 19—The Commerce Department reports a 6.1 percent gain in the gross national product (GNP) for the second quarter of 1977.

The Labor Department says that consumer prices rose 0.4 percent last month, the smallest rise so far in 1977.

Aug. 25—The Commerce Department reports a U.S. trade deficit of \$2.33 billion for July.

Aug. 30—The Commerce Department reports that the composite of leading economic indicators dropped 0.2 percent in July.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East; China; Cuba; Lebanon; Rhodesia*)

Aug. 1—Secretary of State Cyrus Vance meets with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Alexandria, Egypt.

Aug. 2—Secretary Vance and Egyptian President Sadat agree on a possible meeting between Arab and Israeli foreign ministers in Washington, D.C., in the fall to prepare for a Geneva conference.

Aug. 3—President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania arrives to confer with President Carter in Washington, D.C.

Secretary Vance arrives in Damascus, Syria, to discuss Middle East issues with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

Aug. 5—Chief United States Representative to the United Nations Andrew Young leaves on a 10-country, 12-day visit to Latin America to further President Carter's policy of promoting "good relations and stable development."

Aug. 8—Speaking to newsmen at Taif in Saudi Arabia, Secretary Vance says that Saudi officials have told him to expect a change in the Palestine Liberation Organization's opposition to U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 that recognizes Israel's right to exist as a state.

Aug. 9—In Jerusalem, Israeli officials tell Secretary of State Vance that Israel is strongly opposed to giving up occupied territory on the West Bank for the creation of a Palestinian homeland.

Aug. 10—Negotiators for the U.S. and Panama reach "agreement in principle" on a new Panama Canal treaty, which, among other provisions, calls for the transfer of the Canal and the Canal Zone to Panama by the year 2000.

Andrew Young confers in Georgetown, Guyana, with black Rhodesian nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo; Young has interrupted his conferences with Guyanese officials to talk with Nkomo.

Aug. 12—President Carter issues a statement explaining, defending and summarizing the proposed Panama Canal treaty.

Aug. 13—Secretary Vance returns to Washington, D.C., from his Middle East mission.

Aug. 16—Former President Gerald Ford says he is "absolutely convinced it is in the national interest of the United States that the treaty [Panama Canal treaty] be approved."

Aug. 17—Andrew Young concludes his 10-country mission to Latin America and returns with a general endorsement of President Carter's plans for a new regional partnership.

Aug. 19—The State Department announces that foreign service officer Lyle Lane will lead a U.S. diplomatic mission in Cuba, starting September 1, the day a Cuban mission will start to function in Washington, D.C.

Aug. 20—Secretary of State Vance leaves for China; he will stop in Tokyo, Japan, before 4 days of talks in Peking.

The State Department says that the U.S. has formally asked South Africa if Soviet reports that the South African government has plans to test a nuclear bomb are true.

Aug. 22—Secretary Vance begins 4 days of talks with Chinese officials; he calls for mutual efforts by China and the U.S. to normalize relations.

Aug. 24—The White House announces that President Carter will sign 2 Panama Canal treaties in Washington, D.C., on September 7; many Latin American leaders will be present.

Aug. 25—Secretary Vance concludes 4 days of "candid and serious" talks with Chinese officials, including a 1-hour meeting with Chairman of the Communist party Hua Kuo-feng.

Aug. 27—Secretary of State Cyrus Vance returns to Washington, D.C.

Aug. 28—White House officials report that on August 6 Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev communicated with President Carter privately about possible South African nuclear bomb tests and that the two governments cooperated to prevent the possibility of tests.

Aug. 30—President Carter releases a statement that promises U.S. financial aid to Northern Ireland if Protestants and Catholics settle their differences without violence.

U.S. chief U.N. delegate Andrew Young arrives in Nairobi, Kenya, with British Foreign Secretary David Owen to ask for Kenyan President Julius Nyerere's support for a British-American Rhodesian peace plan.

Aug. 31—State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d announces that Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko will meet in Washington, D.C., September 22-23 to discuss an arms control agreement. The meeting was originally scheduled for September 7 in Geneva.

### Labor and Industry

(See also *Economy*)

Aug. 16—At a 3-day meeting in Geneva, members of the International Air Transport Association agree to permit 6 scheduled airlines flying between London and New York to reduce their lowest offseason round-trip fare to \$256, \$94 below the current lowest fare; the new rate will take effect on September 15.

Aug. 22—A wildcat strike by miners that has idled 80,000 workers, largely in and around West Virginia, is apparently ended; miners agree to return to work for 60 days while further negotiations are conducted.

### Legislation

Aug. 2—The Senate votes 76 to 14 and the House votes 353 to 57 to approve the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Energy: the new department will consolidate the functions of the Federal Energy Administration, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Federal Power Commission and smaller divisions of other agencies involved in energy problems.

Aug. 3—President Jimmy Carter signs a bill that establishes the first uniform federal controls on strip mining; the law will become generally effective in January, 1979.

By a 92-1 vote, the Senate ratifies a treaty between the United States and Canada under which the two countries agree not to interrupt or impose discriminatory taxes on gas or oil pipelines that cross each other's territory.

Aug. 5—President Jimmy Carter signs a bill to provide \$1 billion for jobs and training for 200,000 youths, including 35,000 members of a Young Adult Conservation Corps.

Aug. 8—The Joint Economic Committee of Congress makes public a CIA report predicting a slowdown in the Soviet economy in the 1980's.

President Carter signs amendments to the Clean Air Act allowing relaxed federal emission standards for cars manufactured this model year.

The President signs a \$10.9-billion public works appropriations bill that funds 9 of the 18 water development projects the President asked Congress to drop.

### Military

Aug. 24—The latest edition of *Jane's Fighting Ships* says that because of its volunteer makeup the U.S. Navy has an advantage over rival conscript navies.

Aug. 30—Defense Secretary Harold Brown recommends that the U.S. sell Saudi Arabia 60 F-15 supersonic fighters, the most advanced U.S. fighters, in a deal worth about \$1.5 billion.

### Political Scandal

Aug. 1—Special counsel to the House Ethics Committee Leon Jaworski asks the Justice Department for documents purporting to list congressmen who accepted gifts from South Koreans.

Aug. 15—Leon Jaworski takes charge of the House investigation of alleged South Korean influence-buying in Congress.

Aug. 22—The State Department will go to court on August

24 to get permission to search some 200 packing cases left in Washington, D.C., by former President Richard Nixon containing valuable gifts from foreign officials and governments to Nixon and his family.

Aug. 24—Judge Aubrey Robinson, Jr., of the U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., says that the government has the right to look for possible public property in storage boxes left in Washington, D.C., by former President Richard Nixon.

In a news conference in Seoul, South Korea, Tongsun Park, a key figure in the alleged South Korean influence-buying of members of Congress, denies he acted as an agent of the South Korean government and says he will not return to Washington, D.C., nor will he testify.

Aug. 25—A former secretary of House Speaker Carl Albert (D., Okla.), South Korean Suzi Park Thomson, is questioned by the House Ethics Committee; she says she knows nothing about any illegal payments to congressmen; she says also that parties she gave were purely social.

### Science and Space

Aug. 10—The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in Bethesda, Maryland, announces the successful use of an antiviral drug against usually fatal herpes virus encephalitis; the drug is called ara-A.

Aug. 12—The space shuttle Enterprise glides to a landing in the Mojave desert after a 5½ minute flight; the shuttle was taken aloft by a Boeing 747.

Aug. 20—The Voyager II spacecraft is launched at Cape Canaveral, Florida, to explore Jupiter, Saturn and perhaps Uranus; a second Voyager is to be launched early in September.

### Terrorism

Aug. 3—The Puerto Rican terrorist group Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena (FALN) says it is responsible for 2 bombs that exploded in a Manhattan office building today, killing one and injuring 7; threats of bombs in other locations forced more than 100,000 persons to leave their offices.

### VIETNAM

Aug. 26—The official press agency makes public a policy statement issued at the conclusion of a 9-day meeting of the Central Committee of Vietnam's Communist party in June and July, stating that the country faces serious widespread food shortages and that there have been "big mistakes in leadership" in agriculture policy.

### YUGOSLAVIA

(See *China*; *U.S.S.R.*)


### ZAIRE

Aug. 13—Foreign Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bon is arrested on charges of treason because he failed to warn President Mobutu Sese Seko of the pending attack in Shaba Province in March.

### ZAMBIA

Aug. 2—President Kenneth D. Kaunda dismisses Home Affairs Minister Aaron Milner; Milner is replaced by Wilted Phiri, director general of intelligence and security.

Aug. 23—The government issues summonses against 17 Western oil companies for \$6.4 million in damages; the government charges that they defied U.N. sanctions by supplying Rhodesia with oil to the detriment of Zambia.





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